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Sommaire 
Cette thèse a pour sujet les externalités de production. Trois cas particuliers sont étudiés, 
où les coûts et les décisions de production sont intimement reliés. La thèse est divisée en 
trois chapitres. Les deux premiers chapitres traitent ces externalités de production avec 
l'approche coopérative. Il est supposé que les producteurs coopèrent et que la production est 
réalisée conjointement. Nous sommes intéressés par les conditions sous lesquelles les agents 
acceptent volontairement de coopérer, et par les méthodes de partage du coût commun si 
la coopération a lieu. Dans le troisi~me chapitre, l'approche est non-coopérative, et il est 
supposé que. les producteurs sont en compétition. 
Le premier chapitre examine les situations où les externalités de production proviennent 
d'une structure de réseau. Nous étudions les problèmes où des agents, situés à différents 
points dans l'espace, doivent être reliés à une source pour obtenir u'n bien. Le coût d'un arc 
entre deux agents est une fonction du flux passant dans cet arc. Nous sommes intéressés par 
les conditions sous lesquelles il existe toujours au moins une allocation stable des coûts, c'est-
à-dire telle qu'aucune coalition n'a d'incitatifs à quitter unilatéralement la grande coalition. 
Le noyau est l'ensemble de toutes ces allocations. Même si nous trouvons qu'en général, si 
les fonctions de coût sont concaves, le noyau peut être vide, pour certains problèmes simples 
spécifiques, il est toujours non-vide. En particulier, nous' introduisons une nouvelle famille 
de problèmes, appelés problèmes de congestion quasi-symétriques et ordonnés, qui a toujours 
un noyau non-vide. Quand toutes les fonctions de coûts sont convexes, le jeu qui en résulte 
a toujours au moins une allocation stable. 
Le 'deuxième chapitre étudie les problèmes de partage de coûts lorsque les externalités 
de production sont définies de manière générale : les gains de coopération peuvent venir 
de la présence d'autres agents, comme lorsque les agents partagent leurs technologies. Un 
modèle simple est construit, où les économies d'échelle sont éliminées dans le but de se 
concentrer sur les effets du partage technologique. Nous cherchons à trouver des règles de 
partage de coüts équitables. Nous utilisons comme axiome central la propriété que si un agent 
n'améliore jamais la technologie des coalitions auxquelles il se joint, il ne devrait recevoir 
aucune part du gain de coopération. Avec des propriétés de linéarité et de symétrie, cet 
axiome caractérise une famille bien définie de règles. De cette famille, nous proposons une 
règle dérivée de la célèbre valeur de Shapley. Nous trouvons qu'il s'agit de la seule règle 
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de la famille satisfaisant une propriété de limite supérieure sur les allocations individuelles 
ou une propriété de monotonie lorsque la technologie s'améliore. Nous obtenons aussi une 
règle distincte en utilisant une propriété faisant en sorte qu'aucune coalition n'a d'incitatifs 
à manipuler les demandes individuelles de ses membres. 
Dans le troisième chapitre, le sujet d'analyse est un duopole où les firmes produisent 
des biens différenciés verticalement. La qualité de ces produits peut être améliorée par les 
contributions automatiques faites par les usagers, comme dans le cas d'une compagnie de 
logiciels enregistrant les bogues et défaillances subis par ses utilisateurs. Cette technologie 
d'amélioration de la qualité est en contraste avec le concept de code source ouvert, où les 
utilisateurs doivent décider de contribuer. Nous n'avons pas besoin de modéliser cette dé-
cision et mettons l'emphase sur les effets sur la compétition, que nous modélisons par un 
jeu à deux étapes. Nous trouvons que les équilibres ne génèrent pas tous une différenciation 
maximale. Il s'avère aussi qu'une avance initiale n'est jamais renversée, mais que la menace 
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de renversement peut être suffisante pour réduire les prix. Nous examinons aussi les effets 
sur le bien-être, et trouvons qu'augmenter les contributions des usagers augmente toujours le 
bien-être social. En particulier, dans une région des paramètres, augmenter les contributions 
est une amélioration au sens de Pareto. 
Mots clés: externalités de production; théorie des jeux; partage de coûts; noyau; concavité 
permutationnelle; valeur de Shapley; axiome de l'agent négligeable; différenciation verticale; 
contributions des usagers. 
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Summary 
The subject of this thesis is production externalities. Three particular cases where pro-
duction costs and decisions are closely interrelated are studied. The thesis is divided in three 
chapters. The first two chapters deal with these production externalities with a cooperative 
approach. It lS assumed that producers cooperate and production is done jointly. We are 
interested in conditions under which this cooperation happens without any outside interven-
tion, and in the methods to share the common cost if cooperation does happen. In the third 
chapter, the approach is non-cooperative and producers are assumed to compete. 
The first chapter examines situations where the production externalities come from a 
network structure. We study problems where agents, located at different points in space, 
have to be connected to a source to obtain a good. The cost of an arc between two agents 
is a function of the flow that goes through this arc. We are interested in conditions under 
which there always exists at least one stable cost allocation, which is such that no coalition 
has incentives to secede from the grand coalition. The core is the set of all such allocations. 
We find that in general, if the cost functions are concave, the core can be empty. However, 
in specific simple problems, it is always non-empty. In particular, we introduce a new family 
of problems, called the ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems, that always have a 
non-empty core. When ail cost functions are convex, the resulting game always has at least 
one stable allocation. 
The second chapter studies cost sharing problems where production externalities are de-
fined in a general manner: gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, 
such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of 
scale are eliminated in order to focus on technology sharing. We are interested in finding 
fair cost allocation rules. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not 
improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he shouid not get any part of the gain 
from cooperation. With properties of Iinearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a 
well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley 
value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on 
individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also 
derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to 
manipulate the individual demands of its members. 
IV 
In the third chapter, the subject of analysis is a duopoly where firms pro duce vertically-
differentiated goods. The quality of these products can be improved through automatic 
contributions from their users, such as software companies tracking bugs and crashes incurred 
by its users. This quality-improvement technology is in contrast with open-sourcing, where 
agents must decide to contribute. We do not need to model why users contribute, and can 
therefore focus on the effects on competition, that we model as a two-stage game. We find 
that equilibria are not always such that we have maximal differentiation. We also find that 
an initial lead is never reversed, but the threat of leapfrogging can be enough to reduce 
prices. We also look at welfare effects, and find that increasing user contributions always 
increase total welfare. In particular, in one parameter region, increasing user contributions 
is Pareto-improving. 
Keywords: production externalities; game theory; cost sharing; core; permutational con-
cavity; Shapley value; Dummy axiom; vertical differentiation; user contributions. 
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Introduction générale 
La production de biens et services génère dans bien des cas des externalités, qui peuvent 
être positives ou négatives. Les exemples sont nombreux : pollution, congestion, effets de 
réseaux, apprentissage par la production, dispersion de technologies, etc. Ces externalités 
peuvent être supportées par les consommateurs et/ou les autres producteurs. Le premier cas 
a été traité abondamment dans la littérature depuis Pigou (1920). On distingue dans ce cas 
les coûts privés et sociaux. La solution habituelle consiste à utiliser des taxes ou des subsides 
pour réaligner coûts privés et sociaux. La présente thèse s'intéresse au deuxième cas, où les 
coûts et/ou les décisions de production des différents compétiteurs sont étroitement reliés. 
Nous offrons deux approches de résolution. Dans les deux premiers essais, l'approche est 
coopérative; les agents s'unissent pour la production conjointe de biens. Dans le troisième 
essai, l'approche est non-coopérative; dans la plus pure tradition de l'organisation indus-
trielle, les firmes sont en compétition. 
L'analyse de problèmes d'externalités dans la production via l'approche coopérative per-
met de répondre à deux importantes questions : sous quelles circonstances les agents vont-
ils volontairement accepter de coopérer, et s'il y a coopération, comment peut-on diviser 
équitablement les coûts communs de production? Dans des modèles légèrement différents, 
le premier essai traite la question de stabilité, alors que le deuxième tente de trouver des 
solutions équitables. 
Plusieurs idées de la théorie des jeux coopératifs ont d'abord été mentionnées dans la 
littérature sur l'analyse coûts-bénéfices de projets communs. Notamment, les notions de 
stabilité et de partage de coûts se retrouvent dans les analyses des projets de réservoirs d'eau 
à usages multiples de la Tennessee Valley Authority (Ransmeier (1942)). L'analyse formelle 
débute avec la monographie de von Neumann et Morgenstern (1944). Si l'ensemble de joueurs 
est N, un jeu coopératif avec utilité transférable possède une fonction caractéristique qui 
assigne à chaque coalition S ç N une valeur (ou un coût). La notion de noyau, cet ensemble 
d'allocations telles qu'aucune coalition n'a intérêt à quitter le groupe pour réaliser le projet 
de façon indépendante, est développée par Gillies (1953) et Shapley (1953). Bondareva 
(1963) et Shapley (1967) montrent de façon indépendante que les jeux coopératifs avec utilité 
transférable ont un noyau non-vide si et seulement si le jeu est dit balancé. Un jeu est balancé 
si la somme des coûts des différentes coalitions, pondérés par un ensemble balancé de poids, 
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est au moins aussi grande que le coüt total de la grande coalition N. Des poids sont balancés 
si pour tout joueur i, la somme des poids associés aux coalitions auxquelles i appartient est 
égale à un. 
Shapley (1971) trace ensuite le lien entre les jeux concaves et le noyau. Un jeu de coüts 
est dit concave si le coüt d'ajouter un agent à une coalition S est au moins aussi élevé que 
lorsqu'il joint une coalition T, si S ç T. Alors, non seulement le jeu est stable, mais le 
noyau a une forme particulière. Pour une permutation donnée des agents, l'allocation via les 
coüts incrémentaux est telle qu'on assigne à chaque agent le coüt supplémentaire lorsqu'il 
se joint à la coalition formée par les joueurs avant lui dans la permutation choisie. Dans un 
jeu concave, l'allocation via les coûts incrémentaux fait partie du noyau, et ce pour chaque 
permutation des agents. En plus, ces allocations constituent les points extrêmes du noyau. 
En générant les combinaisons convexes de ces allocations, on obtient l'ensemble du noyau. 
Le noyau pouvant être vide, certaines extensions toujours non-vides ont été proposées, 
notamment par Shapley et Shubik (1966) et Maschler, Peleg et Shapley (1979). Alors que le 
concept de jeu coopératif a été appliqué à des jeux avec plus de structure, des raffinements 
propres à ces structures ont aussi été proposés. Voir Bilbao (2000) pour une revue de ces 
raffinements. 
Dans le premier essai, le jeu coopératif a une structure particulière : les externalités 
de production proviennent d'une structure de réseaux. Les agents sont situés à des en-
droits différents et doivent être connectés à une source pour obtenir les biens demandés. La 
construction d'aqueducs, de gazoducs ainsi que de réseaux de distribution d'électricité ou 
d'information constituent quelques exemples de problèmes économiques avec structures de 
réseaux. Les structures de réseaux ont été étudiées d'abord par les chercheurs en recherche 
opérationnelle, qui s'intéressaient aux méthodes de résolution et d'approximation des prob-
lèmes d'optimisation sous-jacents. Les spécialistes en théorie des jeux se sont ensuite servis 
de ces résultats pour discuter des problèmes de partage de coüts. 
Le premier et plus célèbre cas étudié a été celui des arbres de coüts couvrants (cost 
spanning trees) où la source est unique et le coüt de construction d'un arc entre deux agents 
est fixe. Claus et Kleitman (1973) ont été les premiers à s'intéresser au partage de coüts 
dans ce cas. Bird (1976) et Granot et Huberman (1981) ont proposé une allocation qui 
est toujours dans le noyau. L'allocation proposée pouvant être qualifiée d'inéquitable, Kar 
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(2002), Dutta et Kar (2004) et Bergantinos et Vidal-Puga (2007) proposent et caractérisent 
de nouvelles règles. 
Diverses extensions ont été proposées, notamment suite à l'ajout de contraintes de ca-
pacité (Skorin-Kapov (1993)) ou d'applications à des problèmes de transport ou de commu-
nications (par exemple, Kalai et Zemel (1982) et Tamir (1991)). Les modèles d'appariement 
constituent un autre exemple de problèmes économiques avec structures de réseaux. Sharkey 
(1995) fait une revue de tous ces modèles économiques avec structures de réseaux. 
Le premier essai étudie la stabilité de problèmes de réseaux, dans un cas plus général 
que les arbres de coûts couvrants. De façon générale, nous examinons des problèmes où des 
agents, situés à différents endroits dans l'espace, doivent être connectés à une source pour 
obtenir un bien. Le coût sur un arc entre deux agents est une fonction du flux passant dans cet 
arc. Alors que les problèmes avec arbres couvrants imposent que le coût de ces arcs ne soient 
que des coûts fixes, nous permettons n'importe quelle fonction de coûts non-décroissante et 
continue sur 1R++. Les problèmes où toutes les fonctions de coût sont concaves (convexes) 
sont appelés des problèmes concaves (convexes). La notion de demande n'est pas présente 
dans les modèles avec arbres couvrants, tandis que notre modèle permet aux agents d'avoir 
des demandes différentes, ce qui affecte les coûts. Ce problème, appelé problème de réseau à 
source unique et sans contraintes de capacité, a été étudié en recherche opérationnelle. En 
général, il n'existe pas d'algorithme pour trouver une solution optimale exacte. Guisewite et 
Pardalos (1991) offrent une revue des méthodes d'approximations. 
Quant, Borm et Reijnierse (2006) sont les premiers à examiner le problème avec les outils 
de la théorie des jeux. Ils montrent dans un problème légèrement moins général que les 
problèmes concaves peuvent ne pas avoir de solutions stables et que les problèmes convexes 
en ont toujours au moins une. Ils annoncent aussi que le résultat s'étend à l'ensemble des 
problèmes de réseau à source unique et sans contrainte de capacité, un résultat que nous 
prouvons formellement. Dans le cas convexe, bien que chaque arc présente des déséconomies 
d'échelle, les agents ont toujours intérêt à se regrouper. Cela est dû au fait que pour éviter 
les déséconomies d'échelle, les agents tentent de diviser les flux sur le plus grand nombre 
d'arcs possibles. Comme l'ajout d'un agent à un groupe de k individus donne accès à k + 1 
nouveaux arcs, les gains de coopération sont très importants. 
Dans le cas concave, après avoir offert quelques exemples nouveaux et simples de cas où 
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le noyau est vide, nous examinons la sous-famille de problèmes concaves dont le noyau est 
toujours non-vide. Il est déjà connu que les problèmes à arbres couvrants font partie de 
cette sous-famille. Après avoir discuté de quelques exemples simples de problèmes concaves 
et stables, et à défaut d'avoir pu offrir une caractérisation complète de cette sous-famille, 
une toute nouvelle classe est proposée : les problèmes de congestion quasi-symétriques et 
ordonnés. Ils sont tels que tous les agents ont la même demande et que les fonctions de coûts 
sur les arcs entre eux sont identiques. Les agents sont ordonnés selon les coûts sur l'arc les 
reliant à la source. Si l'agent i vient avant l'agent j, alors le coût incrémentaI de la k e unité 
sur l'arc entre la source et i ne doit pas être plus grand que sur l'arc entre la source et j, et 
ce, pour tout entier positif k. 
La stabilité de ces problèmes provient du fait que le jeu de coût associé est permuta-
tionnellement concave, un concept introduit par Granot et Huberman (1982). Bien que plus 
faible que la propriété de concavité, il est suffisant pour garantir un noyau non-vide. En effet, 
le concept de concavité permutationnelle est tel qu'un jeu le respectant possède une permu-
tation des agents pour laquelle les coûts incrément aux, par rapport à cette permutation, 
sont décroissants. Assigner à chaque agent son coût incrémentaI, selon cette permutation, 
donne une allocation stable. Par opposition, ces résultats tiennent pour n'importe quelle 
permutation dans un jeu concave. Les problèmes à arbres de coûts couvrants constituent 
un exemple de tels problèmes. Le concept de concavité permutationnelle a été utilisé pour 
prouver la stabilité de divers problèmes provenant de la recherche opérationnelle (Meca, Tim-
mer, Garcia-Jurado et Borm (2004), van Velzen (2006), van Velzen et Hamers (2003)). Tout 
comme dans le cas des problèmes à arbres couvrants, l'allocation stable trouvée pourrait 
être qualifiée d'inéquitable, laissant la porte ouverte à la recherche d'autres méthodes de 
répartition des coûts. 
Cette question d'équité dans le partage des coûts a été étudiée de façon parallèle à celle 
sur la stabilité. Commençant avec Shapley (1953) qui propose la valeur qui porte son nom, 
une vaste littérature visant à proposer et à axiomatiser des concepts de solution aux jeux 
coopératifs s'est développée. Appliquées aux jeux de coûts, ces solutions sont appelées règles 
de partage de coûts. 
Il convient de distinguer trois modèles standards de jeux de coûts. Le modèle classique 
est celui sous forme coalitionnelle, où tout ce qui est connu est le coût total pour chaque 
5 
coalition. BiUera, Heath et Raanan (1978) ont introduit le jeu continu, où les agents sont 
caractérisés par une demande et où une fonction transforme en coüts n'importe quel point 
de demande dans IR~. Moulin (1995) propose le jeu discret, où les demandes sont dans NN. 
Parmi les règles de partage proposées, mentionnons la valeur de Shapley. Elle consiste 
en une moyenne des coüts incrément aux et possède de nombreuses propriétés. Dans le jeu 
sous forme coalitionnelle, il s'agit de la seule règle satisfaisant les axiomes d'Additivité, de 
Symétrie et de l'Agent Négligeable. L'axiome d'Additivité indique que s'il est possible de 
diviser les coüts en sous-fonctions (production, livraison, administration, etc.), partager les 
coüts totaux ou le faire indépendamment sur chacune de ces sous-fonctions devrait donner 
le même résultat. Bien que de nature mathématique, cette propriété est désirable et fait 
en sorte qu'il n'y a pas de discussions sur le niveau d'agrégation auquel doit s'effectuer le 
partage de coüts. La propriété de symétrie indique que si deux agents sont identiques au 
point de vue de leurs coüts incrément aux, alors ils devraient se voir allouer la même part des 
coüts. Un agent est dit négligeable si ses coüts incrément aux sont toujours nuls. L'axiome 
de l'Agent Négligeable fait en sorte qu'un tel agent se verra attribué une allocation égale à 
zéro. Cette propriété rend les agents responsables pour les coüts causés par leurs demandes. 
Moulin et Sprumont (2006) discutent des implications de cette propriété et comparent avec 
des propriétés ne générant qu'une responsabilité partielle. 
Le deuxième essai considère un jeu de coüts sous une forme nouvelle, inspiré, sans en être 
une généralisation, de la structure de réseaux du premier essai. Les problèmes de partage 
de coüts considérés sont tels qu'il existe une externalité dans la production; les gains de 
coopération peuvent venir de la simple présence des agents, par exemple, lorsqu'il y a partage 
de technologies ou coopération pour la formation d'un réseau. Ceci est en contraste avec les 
modèles traditionnels, où l'hypothèse sous-jacente est que la technologie de production est 
de nature publique, et donc identique pour chacune des coalitions. Nous considérons donc 
ce nouveau type de partage, où la technologie est définie au sens très large; il peut s'agir 
de mise en commun de techniques de production, de ressources, de pouvoirs d'achat ou de 
négociation. Cela implique que le coüt ne dépend plus seulement du niveau de demandes à 
produire, mais aussi de l'identité des agents contribuant à sa production. 
Un modèle simple est construit, où les économies d'échelle sont éliminées pour isoler 
les effets du partage technologique. Les agents sont caractérisés par une demande, et à 
6 
chaque coalition est associée une technologie de production. Dans le cadre du modèle, cette 
technologie consiste en un coût moyen et est telle que lorsqu'une coalition devient plus grande, 
son coût moyen ne peut augmenter. Le coût coalitionnel est alors le coût moyen multiplié 
par la somme des demandes des agents dans la coalition. 
Nous sommes intéressés par les différents concepts de solution pour diviser le coût en-
tre les différents agents et proposons de nouvelles règles. Ces règles sont axiomatisées via 
la propriété d'Agent Technologiquement Négligeable. Cet axiome est tel que si un agent 
n'améliore jamais la technologie d'une coalition à laquelle il se joint, il n'obtient aucune part 
du gain de coopération. La propriété d'Agent Technologiquement Négligeable rend les agents 
responsables pour leur technologie. Cela est désirable quand les agents ont investi temps, 
argent ou ressources pour la développer. Cet axiome est bien sûr fortement lié à la notion 
d'Agent Négligeable, mais ce sont deux axiomes indépendants. Conceptuellement, l'axiome 
est encore plus près de la propriété de Séparabilité. Cette propriété indique que si le coût 
incrémentaI d'un agent est toujours égal à une constante, il devrait se voir attribuer cette 
constante. Comme il ne contribue alors aucunement aux gains d'échelle, il n'en reçoit aucune 
part. 
La section 3 de ce deuxième essai caractérise les règles satisfaisant cet axiome d'Agent 
Technologiquement Négligeable, combiné à une application de l'axiome de Symétrie au mod-
èle considéré, et deux applications de la propriété d'Additivité. La première, la Linéarité 
Technologique, est une extension directe et fait en sorte que si les coûts moyens peuvent 
être divisés en sous-fonctions, le niveau d'agrégation choisi n'est pas important. La deux-
ième, la Linéarité par rapport aux Demandes, implique que chaque unité de demande peut 
faire l'objet d'un partage de coût indépendant. C'est une propriété naturelle étant donnée 
l'absence d'économies d'échelle. Elle fait aussi en sorte que les agents n'ont pas intérêt à 
divulguer un niveau de demande différent du niveau véritable, pour ensuite demander un 
réajustement sur lequel serait effectué un nouveau partage de coûts. 
Les axiomes étant semblables à ceux utilisés pour caractériser la valeur de Shapley, il est 
peu surprenant que cette caractérisation reprenne des étapes de la caractérisation obtenue 
par Weber (1988). Nous obtenons une famille de règles différenciées par la façon dont elles 
répondent à la question suivante : si un agent j est le seul à avoir une demande non nulle, 
lorsque nous calculons la part des coûts de l'agent i, quel poids devrions-nous accorder aux 
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améliorations technologiques générées par l'agent i pour des coalitions ne contenant pas 
l'agent j1 La réponse à cette question consiste en un vecteur de INI - 2 composantes. Les 
sections 4 et 5 offrent ensuite des caractérisations de deux règles appartenant à cette famille. 
La valeur de la contribution technologique partage les coüts de la façon suivante: pour 
chaque agent i, nous définissons un jeu qui assigne à chaque coalition ne contenant pas i 
la variation du coüt moyen quand cette coalition se joint à i. La valeur de Shapley est 
ensuite appliquée sur chacun de ces jeux et multipliée par la demande de l'agent i, pour 
exprimer la valeur créée. Un agent se voit ensuite allouer ces valeurs créées dans chacun 
des jeux, auxquelles on additionne son coüt de faire cavalier seul. Pour caractériser cette 
solution, il suffit d'ajouter la propriété de Rationalité Individuelle, qui implique qu'aucun des 
agents n'a intérêt à quitter unilatéralement la grande coalition, ou la propriété de Monotonie 
Technologique, telle que si la technologie d'une coalition s'améliore, aucune des membres de 
cette coalition n'en souffre. 
La règle de la quasi-moyenne des contributions alloue les coüts ainsi: un jeu est construit 
où chaque coalition se voit attribuer le coüt de produire l'ensemble du vecteur de demande en 
utilisant sa technologie. La valeur de Shapley est ensuite appliquée pour partager les gains 
technologiques. Finalement, les allocations individuelles sont ajustées selon les différences 
entre le niveau de demande individuelle et le niveau moyen. La caractérisation de cette 
règle est obtenue en ajoutant la propriété de Non Réassignation. Cette propriété est telle 
qu'aucune coalition n'a intérêt à manipuler la distribution de la demande de ses membres afin 
de réduire le coüt total qui lui est attribué. C'est donc une importante propriété incitative. 
Le troisièl!le essai utilise l'approche non-coopérative pour étudier les externalités .de pro-
duction. En organisation industrielle, tout modèle d'oligopole, à commencer par ceux de 
Bertrand et Cournot, comportent une part d'externalités et d'interrelations entre les firmes. 
Nous sommes intéressés à des interrelations un peu plus importantes, où non seulement les 
décisions d'une firme influencent directement celles de ses adversaires, mais où on retrouve 
aussi un effet indirect sur les paramètres de base du modèle, comme la fonction de coüts, la de-
mande du marché ou la qualité des produits. De tels exemples sont nombreux. Nous y retrou-
vons notamment les marchés avec économies de réseau (par exemple Katz et Shapiro (1985), 
Farrell et Klemperer (2007)), des marchés avec apprentissage par la production (Cabral et 
Riordan (1994)) et des marchés avec différenciation verticale et détermination endogène de 
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la qualité (Shaked et Sutton (1982)). 
Le cas considéré s'inspire d'un phénomène récent. Avec l'expansion de l'Internet, les 
usagers sont de plus en plus appelés à contribuer directement à la qualité d'un produit. 
Beaucoup d'attention à été portée sur les logiciels à code source ouvert, où chaque utlI-
isateurpeut directement participer, de façon volontaire, à sa programmation. Des sites à 
contenus générés par les utilisateurs, tels YouTube et Wikipedia, sont conceptuellement sem-
blables. L'attention académique s'est essentiellement portée sur les déterminants de cette 
participation (Lerner et Tirole (2005)) et sur l'organisation des participants et l'effet sur la 
productivité. Voir à ce sujet la revue de von Krogh et von Hippell (2006). 
Nous nous intéressons à un cas légèrement différent, où la contribution des consommateurs 
est automatique. Par exemple, une firme productrice de logiciels peut compiler automatique-
ment les instances de bogues ou défaillances observées par ses utilisateurs, ce qui lui permet 
d'améliorer la qualité future de son produit. Pareillement, une firme produisant un logiciel 
anti-virus se sert des informations transmises par ses utilisateurs pour améliorer la protection 
offerte. C'est ce que nous appelons les contributions automatiques des usagers. Dans de tels 
cas, la question des déterminants de la participation n'est plus pertinente. Nous pouvons 
alors nous concentrer sur les effets de ces contributions sur la concurrence. 
Ce cas diffère des effets de réseaux par le fait que les externalités sont sur les consom-
mateurs futurs uniquement, et parce que les consommateurs sont tout à fait libres de passer 
d'un fournisseur à l'autre entre les périodes. Il diffère aussi du cas de l'apprentissage par la 
production, où l'externalité est sur le coût et se transmet généralement à toute l'industrie. Il 
s'agit aussi d'un cas particulier de modèle dynamique de différenciation verticale endogène, 
mais avec la particularité que l'amélioration technologique se fait via les ventes, donc via une 
technologie rivale. Les firmes ont intérêt à être différenciées, mais aussi à être celle avec la 
qualité la plus élevée. Comme elles doivent lutter entre elles, via les prix, pour améliorer la 
qualité de leur produit, les effets nets sur les prix, les profits et le bien-être des consommateurs 
sont incertains. 
Le modèle est tel que les firmes se font compétition sur deux périodes. Les qualités 
initiales sont données, et dans la première période, la phase de développement, les firmes se 
font compétition en prix. Les quantités vendues affectent la qualité du produit à la période 
suivante, la phase de maturité. Le concept d'équilibre étant l'équilibre de Nash parfait en 
\, 
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sous-jeu, nous trouvons d'abord les prix optimaux à la deuxième période avant de remonter 
à la phase de développement. Une caractérisation complète des équilibres en stratégies pures 
'est 'offerte. 
Comme dans la plupart des modèles d'oligopoles dynamiques avec asymétries (Maskin 
et Tirole (1988), Athey et Schmutzler (2001)), nous trouvons que ces asymétries tendent 
à augmenter ; la firme ayant initialement la qualité la plus élevée accentuera son avance., 
Thutefois, contrairement à Tirole (1988) dans son modèle où le choix des qualités est sans 
coüt, nous n'obtenons pas toujours une différenciatiori complète. Dans certains cas, les deux 
firmes vendent une quantité strictement positive dans la phase de développement. 
Dans un cadre général, Athey et Schmutzler (2001) trouvent que même si l'asymétrie 
grandissante a un effet négatif sur le bien-être social, si les investissements ou efforts faits 
pour accentuer cette asymétrie améliorent le bien-être des consommateurs, l'effet net peut 
être positif. Dans notre cas, l'effet net sur le bien-être social est toujours positif. En plus, 
l'effet est positif pas seulement sur l'ensemble des périodes, mais à chaque période. Il est 
même possible qu'améliorer marginalement le niveau des coritributions soit une amélioration 
parétienne. 
Comme dans la plupart des modèles d'oligopoles dynamiques, nous trouvons des possi-
bilités de tarification sous le coüt marginal. Par contre, dans certains cas, la firme dominée 
choisit de ne pas lutter dans la phase de développement dans le but de profiter d'une dif-
férenciation maximale ensuite. Il est alors possible que le prix payé à la première période 
par certains consommateurs augmente. 
Diverses extensions, reliées aux asymétries entre firmes, à une' variation dans le temps 
des préférences des consommateurs et à la couverture du marché sont ensuite discutées. 
Chapter 1 
On the core of single-source 
uncapacitated network flow problems 
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1 Introduction 
We are interested in problems where agents located at different points in space demand a 
good that they can only get from a corn mon source. To obtain this good, they must be 
connected to the source so that the good can be delivered to them. An efficient network is 
built, and the cost of this network must be shared among the agents. Applications of this 
model include gas and oil pipelines, electricity distribution networks, delivery routes and 
communication networks. 
Consider this example. 
Example 1 2 countries, A and B, consider cooperating on the construction of a gas pipeline, 
that would supply them from a foreign country, that we call the source (0). Country A needs 
a supply of 3 millions cubic feet per day. The needs of country B are of 1 million cubic 
feet per day. There are three possible segments to the pipeline: one between the source and 
country A, one between the source and country B, and one between countries A and B. In 
this last segment, the fiow can be from country A to country B, or in the opposite direction. 
If x is the fiow in million cubic feet per day, the cost, in millions of dollars, on the segment 
between the source and A is 3 + x for a strictly positive fiow and 0 else. On the segment 
between the source and B, it is 3x, and between A and B, in any direction, it is x. We then 
have the following possible network configurations (fiows are (,1, italics): 
Figure 1.1: Possible network configurations 
1 3 
4 4 
o 0 
Cost=9 Cost=8 Cost=15 
The second configuration is optimal. 
This model, called the single-source uncapacitated network fiow (SSUNF) problem, has 
been studied extensively in the operations research literature, where the focus has been on 
the search for efficient approximation methods. A natural way to define agame from this 
\ 
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problem is to assign to each coalition its minimal cost to fulfill the demand of its agents. 
We calI this game the SSUNF game. We are interested in the conditions underwhich the 
problem generates agame that has a non-empty core; that is, when there are cost allocations 
such that no subset of agents is better off by leaving the coalition. Such allocations are said 
to be stable allocations. Stability is a crucial concept, as it is important in understanding 
which coalition will form on its own and which will require outside intervention. 
SSUNF games are part of the large family of transferable utility games already stud-
ied in the cooperative game-theoretic literature. It shares characteristics with sorne of the 
early models from this literature, where agents have a demand for a single good, and share 
a production technology to commonly produce the amount of good needed to satisfy the 
demand of every agent. Cost is then shared among these agents. Bondareva (1963) and 
Shapley (1967) independently showed that a cooperative game with transferable utility has· 
a non-empty core if and onlyif the game is balanced. Agame is balanced if the sum of costs 
over aIl coalitions, weightéd by a balanced set of weights, is at least· as large as the cost for 
the coalition composed of aIl agents. A balanced set of weights is such that for any player i, 
the sum of weights over the coalitions that incIude i equalsone. 
Generalizations of this model have been made, notably to cases where. the goods are 
specifie to agents, by Billera and Heath (1982), Mirman and Tauman (1982) and Samet and 
Tauman (1982). In their framework, a characteristic function assigns to any demand vector 
in lRt' a cost value in lR+. In our proposed setting, this cost for each coalition is. directly 
dependent on the underlying network structure. 
Game theoretic tools have been used on many problems that have network characteristics. 
See Sharkey (1995) for a review of many such models. 
SSUNF games have been studied in Quant et al. (2006). They show that if aIl cost 
functions are convex, the. resulting game always has at leastone stable allocation. While 
they prove· the result on restricted versions of SSUNF games and mention that it can be 
extended to aIl SSUNF games, we provide an explicit proof of the result. 1 
Quant et al. (2006). also show that if aIl cost functions are concave, the game can have 
an empty core. As a complement to this result, we offer simpler examples where concave 
1 When this paper was written, the author was aware of a working paper by Quant, Borm and Reijnierse 
·in whiéh they studied restricted versions of SSUNF games. It is only after the author had independently 
proven the result for SSUNF games that .Quand, Borm and Reijnierse mentioned the extension. 
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SSUNF problems generate unstable games. 
While we have this negative result, sorne families of concave SSUNF games are known to 
always be stable. Cast spanning tree games are the most studied example. Cost structures 
are such that there is only a fixed cost associated with each arc. Bird (1976) was the first 
to study cost spanning tree problems with game-theoretic tools, and he proposed a cost 
allocation that is always in the core. An algorithm to generate all core allocations was 
obtained by Granot and Huberman (1984). 
For more general concave SSUNF problems, difficulties arise because of the non-availability 
of exact algorithms to build optimal networks. 2 We try to shed light on the family of con-
cave SSUNF problems generating games with non-empty cores by introducing a new family 
of problems, called the ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems. In this set of prob-
lems, agents all demand the same quantity. Agents are ordered according to costs on the arc 
between the source and them. If agent i cornes before agent j in that order, the incremental 
cost of a kth unit on the arc between the source and agent i is no larger than on the arc 
between the source and agent j, for all positive integers k. For all other arcs, cost functions 
are identical. 
An example of an ordered quasi-symmetric problem would be a situation where neigh-
bors want an internet connection. While they could all get individual connections through 
an Internet Service Provider (ISP), they could set up a network in which one of them is 
subscribing to an ISP, while the others gain access via wireless connections to the subscriber. 
We can suppose that all agents demand roughly the same amount of bandwidth. The cost to 
connect to the wireless network is identical for all agents. The ISP offers quantity discounts, 
as the average price of bandwidth goes down with usage. Most ISP also bundle internet 
connections with other telecommunication services (phone, television) which can result in 
agents facing roughly proportional price schedules. 
We show that this family of problems generates permutationally concave games, a concept 
introduced in Granot and Huberman (1982). It is a weakening of the concept of concavity 
of a game, but it nonetheless guarantees the existence of at least one stable allocation. The 
well-studied class of concave games are such that the cost of adding an agent to a coalition 
never increases when that coalition grows. See also Driessen (1990) for a discussion of the 
2 See Guisewite and Pardalos (1991) for a review of approximation methods. 
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link between stability and permutational concavity. 
The concept of permutational concavity has been used to show non-emptiness of the 
core of minimum cost spanning forest games (Alidaee (1994)), which are a generalization 
of cost spanning trees where there are multiple sources. It is also used in games generated 
by different operations research problems, such as inventory games (Meca et al. (2004)) and 
various sequencing games (van Velzen (2006), van Velzen and Hamers (2003)). Cost spanning 
tree problems also generate permutationally concave games. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines SSUNF problems. In Section 3, we 
study the core of concave SSUNF problems and find that in general, it can be empty. For 
sorne simple SSUNF problems, however, the core is always non-empty. Section 4 introduces 
a family of concave SSUNF problems, the ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems. In 
Section 5, we show that ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems generate games for 
which the core is always non-empty. In Section 6, we look at the case of convex SSUNF 
problems, and we provide an explicit proof of the stability result announced by Quant et al. 
(2006). Section 7 concludes. 
2 The model 
Let N = {1, ... , n} be the set of agents. All agents are located at different points in space, 
called nodes. Each node is identified by the agent occupying it. There is a special node called 
the source, denoted by 0, which does not contain any agent. Each agent has a demand for a 
corn mon good. The demand profile is Q = (ql,"., qn) E IR'+-. A connection to the source is 
needed in order to obtain the good. The set of nodes is No = NU {O} and the set of arcs 
between nodes is A = {(i,j) 1 i,j E No, i i- j}. 
The cost of a flow of Zij units of good on the arc (i,j), that is from node i to node j, 
is Cij(Zij). The cost function Cij : IR+ ---t IR+ is non-decreasing and Cij(O) = O. Cij is also 
continuous on IR++. We do not impose continuity at O. In particular, we allow for functions 
with fixed costs, so that this model includes as particular cases co st spanning trees and linear 
functions with intercept. We call , = (Cij )i,jEN
o 
the co st structure. 
We assume that there is a feasible arc between each pair of nodes in No.3 This allows us 
3This is nat a restrictive assumptian as we can approximate a problem with nan-feasible arcs by assigning 
cast functians ta these arcs that ge~erate an arbitrarily large cast ta any flaw. 
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to define a problem by the set of agents, the demand profile and the cost structure; that is, 
(S, Q, "() with S ç N. The problem implies delivering quantities qi for aIl i E Sand nothing 
to aIl other agents, using only arcs between nodes in Sa, while facing the cost structure 
"(. A problem where the cost structure only contains concave cost functions is said to be a 
concave problem. Concave problems are natural in many settings. The resulting economies 
of scale are characteristic of set-up costs of large physical networks, like gas and oil pipelines 
and water and electricity distribution networks, among many others. Costs for a small fiow 
implies large investments to set the network up, but building a slightly larger network adds 
little to the cost. On the other end of the spectrum, we will also consider cost structures 
where aIl cost functions are convex, called convex problems. This structure is natural in 
many data transmission networks and generally in models where congestion cornes into play. 
If we think of the co st in term of time of transmission, larger flows imply congestion and can 
induee exponential growth in the time of transmission. 
If Cij(X) = Cji(X) for aIl i,j E No and aIl x E lR+, then we say that the co st structure is 
symmetric. While simpler, this assumption can be naturally dropped in many settings, for 
instance if gravit y affects costs. Then, if there is a slope between i and j, costs on the arc 
(i,j) and (j,i) need not be symmetric. 
A provision plan is a matrix Z E lRt which assigns a flow Zij 2: a to every arc (i, j) in 
A. For a plan Z, define supp(Z) = {(i,j) E AI zij > a}, the set of arcs used in the plan Z. 
A path rij(Z) from i to j in Z is a sequence {(ih-l,ih)}~=l of arcs in supp(Z), aIl distinct 
and such that i = io and j = il. Define Rij(Z) as the set of aU paths rij(Z). We say that 
a plan Z is a tree if for aU agents i, Rai (Z) is a singleton, that is for any agent, there is a 
unique path between the source and i. 
FormaUy, for the problem (S,Q,"(), with S ç N, we define the set of feasible provision 
plans as the set of plans Z satisfying these properties:4 
I:iES ZOi 2: I:iES qi ) 
I:jENo\{i} (Zji - Zij) 2: qi for aU i E S 
Zij = Zji = a for aIl i E N\S, aU j E No 
(1.1) 
We will denote by F(S, Q) the set of plans which respect the conditions (1.1) with equal-
4 If we impose that Zio = 0 for ail i E N, then the first condition is implied by the second. White the two 
set of conditions are equivalent, the proposed one is more illustrative. 
, 
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ities. We can restrict our attention to F( S, Q) since the functions Cij are non-decreasing. In . 
addition, it is clear that p~ans in which we have flows Zij > 6 and Zji > ° are always at least 
as costly as a plan Z' that has zIj = max(zij - Zji,O) for aIl (i,j) E A. 
The first condition in (1.1) implies that the total flow going out of the source must be 
equal to what is consumed within the network. The second condition ensures that subtracting 
what goes out of anode from what goes in leaves enough quantity to respond to the demand 
of the agent at this node. The third condition says that agents in Sare constrained to use 
only the nodesthat are in Sa. 
The optimization problem faced by a coalition Sis to find a feasibleplan Z E F(S, Q) that 
minimizes the cost c(Z) = ~(i,j)EA Cij(Zij). An efficient plan ZS is in argminzEF(S,Q) c(Z). 
Let C(S, Q,,) = min {c(Z) 1 Z E F(S, Q)} denote the resulting minimal cost.5 The map-
ping C(·,Q,,) : 6U{N} -> lR+ is the TU-cooperative game generated by (N,Q,,), with 
6 = {S 1 0 i- SCN},6 that we calI the single-source uncapacitated network flow (SSUNF) 
game. 
The game C(·,Q,,) is sub"additive, that is C(S,Q,,) + C(T,Q,,) :::: C(S U T,Q,,) 
for all S, T c N such that Sn T = 0. For sets S and T, the sum of their respective 
efficient plans is a feasible plan for SUT.· Bince Sand T are disjoint, this plan will have 
cost C(S, Q,,) + C(T, Q,,). Therefore, by de finition of C(., Q,,); we have C(S, Q,,) + 
C(T,Q,,):::: C(SUT,Q,,). 
However, C(·,Q,,) is not always monotonic. It is possible that adding an agent allows 
the coalition to use lower cost arcs that will reduce the overall cost, as illustrated by this 
simple example. 
ExaInple 2 Suppose a network with2 agents and a source. We have Q = (1,1), Col(X) = 
x, Co2(X) = lOi, cdx) = C21(X) = 2 for all xE lR++ and Cij(O) = ° forall (i,j) E A. 
We have C({2},Q,,)"= 10 and C({1,2},Q,,) = min{lO+ 1,2+2,20+2} = 4. Thus 
C({2},Q,,) > C({1,2},Q,)l 
A cost allocation for the problem (N, Q,,) is a vector y assigning a cost share to each 
agent i E N. The efficiency condition imposes that ~iEN Yi ~ C(N, Q, ,). We will not impose 
any other condition on y. In particular, we will not impose Yi :::: O. As we saw in Example 
5Since co st functions are non-decreasing.and C;j(O) = 0 for ail i,j E No, the existence of a minimum is 
guaranteed. 
·6Thr~ughout this thesis, è is meant as ~. 
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2, in sorne problems an agent can generate important economies to other agents by letting 
them use his node to connect to the source. In such problems, it would be conceivable to 
subsidize this agent. 
The core of the problem (N, Q, 1) is the set of cost allocations such that no subset S of 
N is beUer off by leaving the grand coalition N. 
Formally, we define the core as 
, { L:iESYi:::; C(S,Q,,) for all SeN } 
core(Q, 1) = Y . 
Yi C(N,Q,,) 
We say that a problem (N, Q, 1) is stable (unstable) if core(Q, 1) is non-empty (empty). 
3 Concave SSUNF problems 
Building the network is the first step in determining the stability ofa problem. It is a crucial 
step, as knowledge of the structure of the efficient plans is needed to talk about stability. 
Unfortunately for general concave SSUNF problems, we do not have an algorithm that can 
exactly solve all cases. 
We know, from a classic result from Zangwill (1968) that we will always have in a concave 
problem a tree among the efficient plans. The only way to find the exact solution is thus to 
enumerate all feasible trees and choose one that minimizes costs. For large problems, this 
will likely be impossible. Finding the core necessitates solving 2N efficiency problems, one 
for each coalition, so this becomes a problem even for games with few agents. 
3.1 Examples showing possible instability 
Quant et al. (2006) show, with a 6-player example, that concave SSUNF problems can be 
unstable. We offer two simpler examples, that illustrate that even with only 3 players stability 
is difficult to achieve. 
Example 3 (N, Q, 1) is a concave problem with a non-symmetric cast structure such that 
N = {1, 2, 3} and Q (1,1,1). For x> 0, we have the following cost functions: Col (x) = 3, 
2x, 
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Figure 1.2 illustrates efficient plan(s) for each coalition of a least two agents. Flows are 
indicated in italics. 
Figure 1.2: Optimal plans for non-singleton coalitions in Example 3 
Coalitio. S=[1.21 Coalitio. S={I,3} Coalitioa S={2,3) 
1 ( CV 
® 
/. 
Coalitioa S={1,2,31 
CD 
/-
1 CD ) 
~' 
® 
We can verify that the function C(·, Q, ,) takes the following values: 
8 0(8,Q,,) 
{l} 3 
{2} 6 
{3} 5 
{l,2} 7 
{l,3} 7 
{2,3} 9 
{l,2,3} 12 
Using these values, we know that, for the core to be non-empty, we must have Yl + Y2 ::; 7, 
Yl + Y3 ::; 7 and Y2 + Y3 ::; 9. Adding these 3 constraints, we get Yl + Y2 + Y3 ::; 11.5 < 12 = 
C(N, Q, ,). Thus, the core is empty. 
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Example 4 (N, Q, ~() is a concave problem with a symmetric cost structure such that N 
{l, 2, 3} and Q = (100,1,1). For x > 0, we have the following cast functions: COI (x) = 6, 
C02(X) = 2, Co3(X) = 4, C12(X) = C21(X) 1 + ~, C23(X) = C32(X) 3 + C13(x) = C31(X) 
5 + io~ x with E E ]0,0.009] . 
Figure 1.3 illustrates efficient plan(s) for each coalition of a least two agents. Flows are 
indicated in italics. 
Figure 1.3: Optimal plans for non-singleton coalitions in Example 4 
CoalitioJl S=[1.2} CoalitioJl S=(l,l} CoalilÎOJI S={l,l} 
G) l 
;/. 100 ~ CD d1) < G) 2 ~ /-' (0 (0 ® 
Coali:tioD S=(1,2,l) 
~ 
G) /(j)~ 2 /1 
ICD Ci) CD Ci) ~@ ~ ~ /. 102 
® ® ® 
We can verify that the function Ch Q, 'Y) takes the following values: 
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S C(S,Q,,) 
{1} 6 
{2} 2 
{3} 4 
{1,2} 7.5 
{1,3} 10 - E 
{:l,il} 5.5 
{l,:l,il} 11.5 
Sinee we must have YI + Y2 :::; 7.5, YI + Y3 :::; 10 - E and Y2 + Y3 :::; 5.5, adding these 3 
constmints gives us YI+ Y2 + Y3 ~ 11.5 - ~ < 11.5 = C(N, Q, ,). Thus, the core is e~pty. 
3;2 Simple stable concave SSUNF problems 
As seen in the previ6us subsection, in the general concave case, . the core of the associated 
cost game can be empty. In addition, algorithms to find exact optimal solutions do not exist. 
However, sorne simple concave problems are easily solved and theii natural solutions lead us 
to conclude that these problems are always stable. 
First, if the cost functions do not depend on the magnitude of the flows, that is they are 
of the form Cij(X) = kij if X> 0, we are back to the cost spanning tree format and we can 
apply Prim's algorithm, which builds an efficient plan arc by arc,· selecting at each step an 
arc that connects at the smallest cost an agent not previously connected. We know in this 
format that the core is always noncempty (Bird (1976)). 
If the costs depend on the magnitude of the flows, the simplest problem is the linear 
problem, where, is such that we havec.;j(x) = aijX for aIl (i,j) E A and ail x E IR+.To find 
the optimal plan in such problems, one can look at each agent i separately, select an optimal 
path between 0 and i, and sum these paths. FormaIly, take a plan Z such that Zjk > 0 for ail 
(i, k) E A. For agent i, select a path Pi. E arg minrOi(Z)EROi(Z) 2:U,k)ErOi(Z) ajk and construct 
a plan Zi such that Z;k = qi if (j, k) E Pi and 0 otherwise. Then, the optimal plan for the 
coalition N is Z· = 2:iEN Zi. This is called the short est path algorithm. 
We can go one step further, in the case of the linearproblem with equal fixed cost, where 
, is such that wehave Cij(X) = b + aijX for all (i,j) E A and x E IR++, with b 2: 0 being 
a fixed cost that is the same on all arcs. We can keep using the· short est path algorithm, 
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but this time adding the constraint that we choose the optimal paths Pi such that for any 
S.ç N, EiEs Zi fmm a tree. Define.,1 as a cost structure generating a linear problem, and 
.,1 as a cost structure where we add ~ equal fixed cost b to aIl cost functions in .,1. We then 
have, for aIl S ç N, C(S,Q,.,/) = C(S,Q,.,I) +mb where m::; ISI is the riumber of agents 
in S having strictly positive demands. 
Since in this problemall arcs h,ave the same fixed cost, it does not become a factor in the 
network design, other than limiting the total number of arcs that we build. 
in the linear problem, a very natural way to allocate the cost is to assign to each agent 
the cost of bis path, that is yi = c(Z.) for aIl i EN. One can easily see that this ailocation 
. is always in core(Q,.,I). 
Using the fact that C(S, Q,.,/) = C(S, Q,.,l)+mb, wherem ::; ISI is the number of agents 
in S having strictly positive demands, and the fact that core(Q,-yl) is non-empty,it is clear 
that assigning, for aIl i E N, yr yt + b if q. > 0 and yr = yt = 0 otherwise, will generate 
an allocation in core( Q, .,/). In the case where aIl agents have strictly positive demands, we 
have core( Q, .,/) = core( Q, .,i) + b. 
Furthermore, we can easily prove that if we have the triangular inequality, that is aij ::; 
aik + akj for aIl i, j, k E No, then an efficient plan connects aIl agents directly to the source. 
Then, the function C(.,Q,.,) is additive and core(Q,"() is the singleton Yi = Co;(q;). 
For the next sets of simple stable concave SSUNF games, we need som~ definitions. We 
. will say that an arc (i, j) is primary if i 0 and j .E N, that is if it is between the source 
and an agent i E N. Similarly, we will say that an arc (i, j) is secondary if i, j E N: We say 
that an agent i is connected directly in plan Z if (0, i) E supp(Z). Otherwise, he is conneeted 
indirectly . 
. Another simple case is when secondary arcs are extremely costly compared to prirnary 
arcs. Suppose that Coi is a concave function for aU i E N and that Cij(X) = k if x > 0 for 
ail i, j E N, with k > maxiEN Coi (EjEN qj) . Costs on secondaryarcs, k, areso large that 
it is clear that the efficient way to connect a11 agents is by using only the primary arcs. We 
then have, for any ., having this structure and any S ç N, that C(S, Q, "() = 
Clearly the game is additive,.and core(Q,"() is the singleton Yi = Coi (qi) for aIl i E N. 
We can extend this result to conc1ude that whenever secondary arcs have arbitrarily large 
costs compared to primary arcs~ we will have this efficient plan where aIl agents are directly 
22 
connected to the source, in which case the game is additive and core( Q, ,) a singleton. 
The opposite case is when secondary arcs have no costs for any fiow. \Ve say that a 
problem is a concave problem with free secondary arcs if, Îs such that we have COi(X) = !i(X) 
for aU i E N, with !i(X) concave, and Cij(X) 0 for aU i,j EN and an x E ~+. 
In such a problem, it is optimal to have only one agent directly connected to the source, 
say agent i, and aU other agents connected to this agent i. Since in this model we allow 
different concave cost functions on arcs (O,j), we will have that if agent i is the one that is 
directly connected to the source in the problem C(S, Q, ,), then i E arg minjEs !jCE.kES qk). 
Thus for any concave problem with a cost structure with free secondary arcs, C(S, Q,,) = 
minjES fJC2:,kES qk). 
To prove that the core of this game is non-empty, define the more restrictive game 
C'(S, Q,,) qj) with F(x) == miniEN !i(X) for aU xE 1R+ and aU S ç N. Since in 
a concave problem with free secondary arcs an li are concave functions and the minimum 
of concave functions is concave, F is concave. Thus, incremental cost cannot be increasing 
in the size of S, and core(C'(S,Q,,)) is non-empty. It is also clear that for SeN, we 
have C'(S, Q,,) :::; C(S, Q,,) and C'(N, Q,,) = C(N, Q, ,). Since the conditions to be in 
core(C(·,Q,,)) are less strict than for core(C'(·,Q,,)), allocations in core(C'(·,Q,,)) are 
in core(C(·,Q,,)). Therefore, core(Q,,) is non-empty for any concave problem with free 
secondary arcs. 
Thus, at the opposite end of the spectrum, we know that if costs on secondary arcs are 
arbitrarily small compared to costs on primary arcs, core( Q, ,) will be non-empty. 
4 Ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems 
We introduce a new and non-trivial set of problems that generate stable games. We look 
at a subset of concave problems that have the foUowing characteristics. Agents aIl demand 
the same quantity, that we normalize to one unit. For any i, j, k, l E N and m E ~+, we 
have Cij(m) ckl(m); oost functions on secondary arcs are identical. In particular, define 
() Cij (1). For aIl i, j E N, let a) = Coi (j) - Coi (j - 1) be the marginal cost of unit j 
along arc (0, i). Agents are ordered according to these marginal costs on their primary arc. 
FormaUy, for aIl kEN, if i < j then ai :::; a~. The case where cost functions on primary 
arcs are aIl proportional is an obvious example of this structure. The concavity of the cost 
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functions imposes that for aU i,j, kEN, a) ~ ai if j < k. We call such a problem an ordered 
quasi-symmetric congestion problem. This terminology comès from the fact that costs on 
secondary arcs are identical, while agents are ordered according to costs on primary arcs. 
Since demand plays no role, an ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problem is defined by 
(N'I)' 
An optimal plan for an ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problem can be found using 
the following Aigorithm: 
Algorithm 1 i) Let rn a~ + () al' For aU i E N\ {l, n}, compute ri = a~+n-i + () 
ii) If miniEN\{l} ri ~ 0, let, for aU i E N, ZOi = 1 and Zij = 0 else, define l 0 and 
terminate. Otherwise, move to step iii). 
iii) Pick the smallest jE N\ {1} such that rj = miniEN\{l} ri' Th en, ZOl n j + 1, for 
all i ~ j, Zli 1, for all1 < i < j, ZOi 1 and Zile = 0 otherwise. Define l {j, j + 1, ... , n} , 
l is the set of agents connected indirectly in the optimal plan selected by the algorithm. 
Let D = N\I be the set of agents connected directly. More generaUy, let l s den ote the set 
of agents connected indirectly in the problem (8, 1)' 
For every i E {2, ... , n}, the algorithm computes ri, the difference in cost between the 
network where agents {i, i + 1, ... , n} are connected indirectly and the network where aU 
agents are connected directly. Steps ii) and iii) then select the optimal network. 
This gives us an expression for the cost of coalition N, C(N, 1) = EIeEN\1 a~ + () III + 
",I I I+1 1 
L..1e=2 ale' 
In order to prove that this algorithm generates efficient plans, we need the following 
notation, 
Notation 1 For any i E N, let [il denote the set {l, .. " i}, 
Theorem 1 For any ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problem, a plan Z found using 
Algorithm 1 is an optimal plan, 
Proof. Following Zangwill (1968), we can restrict our attention to trees. 
Suppose that m 2: 2 agents are connected on a path to agent i, who is connected to the 
source. Cost is cOi(m + 1) + E;:l Cij(m -l + 1). This plan is always (weakly) dominated by 
a plan where the m agents are directly connected to i, as co st is cOi(m + 1) + mCij(l). 
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Moreover, if the set of agents S have to be connected indirectly; it isalways optimal to 
connect them to the same agent, as cost functionsare concave. Moreover, as C01(X).:S: Coi(X) 
for aIl i E N and all x E IR+, agent 1 should always be connected directly to the source . 
We can limit our attention to the set of plans where we have a set of agents D ç N such 
that 1 E D that are directly connected to the source and a set 1 = N\D that are connected 
indirectly. 
AIso, notice that in order for Z* to be optimal, if i E l, than for aIl j > i, j E 1. Suppose 
that there exists a j > i such that j E D. Then, c(Z*) = Col (111+1)+ III B+ L:kED\{j} a~+a{. 
It is weakly dominated by the plan Z' where jE l', i E D', D\ {j} = D'\ {i} and 1\ {i} = 
1'\ {j}. The cost is then c(Z') = c01(II'1 + 1)+ 11'1 B+ L:kED'\{i} a~+a1. Thus, in an optimal 
plan, therè exists an i E N such that D = [il. 
For aIl iE N, let Zi be the plan where D = [il. 
Step ii) of the algorithm verifies if zn is optimal. If not, step iii) finds an optimal Zi by 
looking at aIl of them. • 
Theorem 1 tells us that the agents connected indirectly ·are always those at the end 
of the ranking. Therefore, if 1 = {i,i+l, ... ,n}, then C(N,,) = L:~~lla~ +B(n-i+ 
1) + L:~:1+2 al. An ordered quasi-symmetric congestion game might have more than one 
optimal plan, but the algorithm picks the one with the largest set of (consecutive) players 
connected indirectly. Thus, C(N, ,) <L:{:~ a~ + O(n - j + 1) + L:~:~+2a! for aIl j < i and 
C(N,,) :s: L:{:~ a~ + O(n - j + 1) + L:~:~+2 al for aIl j > i. 
For ariy coalition S = {SI, ... , slsl} ç N where agents are ordered in the same way as in 
N, we have, by Theorem 1, 
11sl+2 
C(S,,)= L a~+Ollsl+ L 
kES\ls k=2 
~Sl . 
~k • 
5 Permutation~l concavity andstability of ordered quasi-
symmetric congestion problems 
The concept of concàvity of agame is closely related to the core. Agame is said to be 
concave if adding an agent to a coalition S is at least as costly as adciing him to a coalition 
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T, for SeT. These games have acore that is easily characterized: if we take an ordering 
of the agents and assign to each of them his incremental cost, we obtain an extreme point of 
the core. In fact, every extreme point can be obtained in that manner (Shapley (1971)). In 
addition, every game having a core with this characteristic must be a concave game (Ichiishi 
(1981)). 
We use a related concept, permutational concavity, introduced by Granot and Huberman 
(1982). The formaI definition follows. 
Definition 1 Agame C is permutationally concave if there exists a labeling of the players 
1,2, ... , n such that 
C ([i] US) - C([j]) ::; C([i] uS) - C([i]) 
for all S ç N\ [il and j 2: i. 
This is in contrast with a concave game, for which the above definition holds for any 
labeling of the agents. Alternatively, in a concave game, we have 
C (S U T) - C(T) ::; C(S UT') C(T') 
for aH T' c T and aIl S ç N\T. 
While permutational concavity is a weakening of the concept of concavity, it nonetheless 
guarantees the existence of at least one stable allocation. 
Theorem 2 (Granot and Huberman (1982)) A permutationally concave game has a non-
empty core. 
The proof of this result consists in showing that the allocation Yi C ([i]) - C([i - 1]) is 
always in the core. Again, by contrast, while this allocation is in the core of a permutationally 
concave game only when agents are correctly ordered, in a concave game, this allocation will 
be in the core for any ordering of the agents. 
We show that ordered quasi-symmetric congestion games are stable, by demonstrating 
that they are permutationally concave. 
Theorem 3 Any ordered quasi-symmetric congestion game (N, "Y) has a non-empty core. 
We require the following lemma. 
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Lemma 1 For ordered quasi-symmetric congestions problems (8, î) and (T, î), with 8 ç 
T ç N such that 8 (81, ... , 81sl) and T (h, ... , tiTI) , if their elements are ordered in the 
same manner as in N and if 81 tb then ls ç IT. 
Proof. Suppose that ls {8t+l' ... , 8ISI}' with SHI tp+1 = jE N. Since 8 ç T, we have 
l ::; p. By Theorem 1, agents connected indirectly in an optimal plan are the agents ranked 
highest. We first show that Ilsi ::; IITI. 
By our assumption on ls, C(8, î) 
Taking into account the non optimal plan to connect agents {Sm+h ... , 81SI} indirectly to 
the source, with m E {l + 1, ... , 181}, we have 
m ISI-m+l 
C(8,î)::; Lafk +0(181 m) + L al and hence, with the definition of C(8,î) 
k=l 
O(m l) + 
k=2 
ISI-H1 
L 
k=ISJ-m+2 
al < k- (1.2) 
With respect to coalition T, consider the plan to connect the 181 - 1 last agents, that is 
{tITHSI+I+l' ... , tiTI} , indirectly to the source. The cost of such a plan is 2:l~~ISI+1 a~k + 
0(181 - l) + 2: lS1;t+1 a~. As an alternative, consider a plan where the set of agents connected 
indirectly is {tITI-ISI+m+l, ... , tiTI}' with mE {l + 1, ... , 181}. We will have that the first plan 
has a lesser or equal cost if 
ITI-ISI+1 ISI-I+1 L aik +0(181 l) + L al 
k=l 
which simplifies to O(m l) + 
k=2 
ISH+1 
L al 
k=ISI-m+2 
ITI-ISI+m ISI-m+l 
< L a~'k +0(181- m) + L al 
< 
k=l 
ITI-ISI+m 
L 
k=ITI-ISI+l+1 
k=2 
(1.3) 
By the assumption that 8HI = tp+l = j and since p ::; l + ITI - 181, we have that 
tlTHSIH 2:: Bk, and by the ordering assumption, that a~k+ITHSI 2:: a~k for aIl k E {l + 1, ... , m} . 
Therefore, 2:~~~tS~HI aik 2:: 2:;;'=I+l a~k, and by (1.2), (1.3) holds. Hence, for coalition 
T, a plan where the last 181 l agents are connected indirectly is (weakly) better than any 
plans containing less agents connected indirectly. Thus, Ilsi ::; IIrI. 
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By our assumption on Is, we obtain, by letting m l + 1 in (1.2), that 
(1.4) 
With respect to coalition T, we know that IITI 2": ISI- l. We have that a plan where the 
last ISI - l + 1 agents are connected indirectly to the source is (weakly) better than a plan 
where the last ISI l agents are connected indirectly if 
ITHSI+t-l !SI-t+2 ITI-ISI+1 ISI-I+l 
L aik + () (ISI l + 1) + L al < L aik + () (ISI - I) + L al k 
k=l k=2 k=l k=2 
which simplifies to () + arSI-1+2 < atITI-ISI+I 1 (1.5) 
By the concavity assumption, afSI-1+2 ::; arSI-l+l' By the same argument as in the first 
step, a~'TI-1SI+! 2": a~l+l . Therefore, by (1.4), (1.5) holds. 
More generally, with respect to coalition T, we will have that a plan where the last r + 1 
agents are connected indirectly to the source is (weakly) better than a plan where the last r 
agents are connected indirectly if 
ITI-r-l r+2 I: aik + () (r + 1) + I: al 
k=l k=2 
which simplifies to () + a~+2 
ITI-r r+l 
::; I: aik + ()r + I: al 
k=l k=2 
< tlTI-r al 
For aIl r 2": ISI l, a;+2 ::; arSI-IH by the concavity assumption (that is, al ::; af for all 
k 2": I). We have a~ITI-r 2": a~'+l = a{ if ITI - r 2": p + 1 (using the fact that SIH = tpH = j 
and the ordering assumption). Therefore, for aIl r E {ISI l, ... , ITI- P -1}, we have, using 
(1.4), that 
Thus, for coalition T, a plan where the last ITI - p - 1 agents connect indirectly to the 
source is (weakly) better than a plan where k < ITI - p - 1 connect indirectly. Formally, 
{tp+l, ... , tiTI} ç h· By our definition, S ç T and Is = {StH' ... , SISI}' with SIH = tp+l j. 
Therefore,ls ç h .• 
We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 3. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Fix a pair i,j E N of players with i 2": i and let S ç N\ lil. For 
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notational simplicity, let h = I[k] and h,s = I{[k]us} for k E {i, j} . We also assume that the 
cost structure 1 is fixed, and thus omit it from the notation. By Lemma 1, either Ii,s ç 8 or 
8 ç Ii,s. That is, with respect to the unified coalition [il U 8, either the indirectly connected 
players are part of 8 or cover 8. We distinguish these two cases. 
Case 1: Ii,s ç 8. Then Ii = 0 because Ii ç [il ç N\8, whereas Ii ç Ii,s ç 8 due to 
Lemma 1 and the relevant assumption. Hence, by their optimal plans, we have 
11i,sl+1 
C([i]) L al as well as C ([i] U 8) = L a~ + () IIi,sl + L al while 
kE [il kE (S\Ii,S )U[i] k=2 
11jl+1 
C ([j]) L a~+()IIjl+ L al· 
k=2 
Notice that Ij n Ii,s = 0 since Ii,s ç 8, while Ij ç li] ç N\8. With respect to coalition 
[j] U 8, take into account the plan to connect agents of {li] \Ij} U {8\hs} directly to the 
source, and the remaining agents Ij Uli,s indirectly to the source. In view of this non-optimal 
plan for coalition li] U 8, it follows that 
11j 1+1 1i,sl+1 
C ([j] U 8)::; L a~ + L a~ + () (lIjl + IIi,sl) + L al 
kE[j]\IJ kES\Ii,S k=2 
and in particular, C W] U 8) - C([j]) ::; C([i] U 8) - C([i]) due to concavity of the cost 
function COI (that is, al ::; ai for all k ~ l). 
Case 2: 8 ç hs. Then 8 ç Ii,s ç hs by Lemma 1. DenoteI:,s = h,s n [k] for 
k E {i, j} . Thus, by their optimal plans, we have for l E {i, j} 
l-lll,sl IS I+ll!,sl+1 
C([l]U8) L a~ + () (1 8 1 + II/,sl) + L al as well as 
k=l k=2 
1-1/11 1/11+1 
C ([l]) L a~ +()IId + L al· 
k=l 
We distinguish two subcases, depending on the relative sizes of Ij and Ij,s' 
Subcase 2(i): IIjl ~ II/,sl· Then /IJ,s/ ~ IIjl ~ IIi,sl ~ IIil by Lemma 1. 
(1.6) 
(1. 7) 
With respect to coalition [j] U 8, taking into account the non-optimal plan to conne ct 
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agents of Ij U S indirectly to the source, we have 
j-11jl ISI+11jl+1 
C ([i] US) < L a~ + B (ISI + IIjl) + L a~ and hence, by (1.7), 
k=1 k=2' 
ISI+11jl+1 
C ([,i] uS) - C ([.il) < B ISI + L al· 
k=11jl+2 
With respect to coalition [il , taking into account the non-optimal plan to connect agents 
of II,s indirectly to the source, we have 
i-II:,sl 111,51+1 
C ([iD < L a~ + () 1 Ii,s 1 + L al and hence, by (1.6), 
k=1 
ISI+II;,s 1+ 1 
C ([i] uS) - C([i]) > () ISI + L al· 
k=IIt,sl+2 
k=2 
We conclude that C ([,il uS) - C([j]) ::; C ([i] uS) C([i]) due to concavity of the cost 
fun ct ion COl (that is, a~ ::; ai for all k ~ l), together with IIj 1 ~ II1,s 1. 
Subcase 2(ii): IIjl ::; IIf,sl· Then, IIJ,sl ~ II1,sl ~ IIjl ~ IId by Lemma 1. 
With respect to coalition [.i] uS, taking into account the non-optimal plan to connect the 
last (IItsl + ISI) agents indirectly to the source, we have, by noting IIf,sl ::; II1,sl ::; i, 
j-11t,sl ISI+11;,sl+1 
C ([i] US) < L a~ + () (ISI + II1,sl) + L a~ and hence by (1.6), 
k=l k=2 
ISI+ln,sl+1 
C ([,i] uS) - C([,i]) < () (ISI + III,sl-IIjl) + L a~ 
k=IIjl+2 k=j-IIf,sl+1 
k 
al' 
With respect to coalition [i], taking into account the non-optimal plan to connect the 
last IIjl agents indirectly to the source, we have, by noting that IIjl ::; II1.sl ::; i, 
i-I~I 1~I+l 
C ([i]) < L a~ + () IIj 1 + L a~ and hence, by (1.7), 
C ([i] US) - C([i]) 
k=l k=2 
ISI+II:,sl+l 
> () (ISI + II1,sl- IIjl) + L 
k=IIjl+2 
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We conclude that C ([i] U S)-C([j]) ~ C ([i] U S)-C([i]) due to the ordering assumption 
at ~ ai for aIl k ~ l, that is the cost functions satisfy Cok (1) ~ COL (1) for aIl k ~ l. • 
As a special case, we look at coalition-symmetric congestion problems, which are ordered 
quasi-symmetric congestion problems where for aIl i,j,k E N, cOi(k) = Coj(k). Therefore, 
we have a~ = at = ak. This game is permutationally concave and the allocation Yi ",,; 
C ([i]) - C([i - 1]) is in the core. Since aIl players are symmetric, it is true for any ordering 
of the agents. Therefore, the game is not only permutationally concave, but also concave. 
The structure of the network is also simplified. 
Proposition 1 For a coalition-symmetric problem (N, ,), there exists kEN such that for 
all S ç N containing m ~ k agents, the set of efficient plans contains a plan where all 
agents are connected directly to the source. For all S ç N containing m > k agents, the set 
of efficient plans contains a plan where one agent is connected directly to the source and aU 
other agents are connected to this agent. 
Proof. From Theorem 1, we know that there is an efficient plan where a set of agents is 
connected directly to the source, with other players aIl connected to the same agent. Since 
aIl players are symmetric, only the number of agents in each set matters. Let Z1 E F(S) be 
such a plan for coalition S where the number of agents connected directly to the source is 
l ~ ISI. 
Suppose that ZS" is an efficient plan, with 1 < m < ISI. We have that c(ZS") ~ C(Z~-l), 
or 
ISI-m+l ISI-m+2 
mal + (ISI- m) () + L ak ~ (m - l)al + (ISI- m + 1) () + L ak 
i=2 i=2 
which simplifies to al ~ () + aISI-m+2. 
We also have that c(ZS") ~ C(Z~+I), or al ~ () + aISI-m+l. Therefore, we need al E 
[() + aISI-m+l' () + alsl-m+2]. By the concavity assumption, alsl-m+1 ~ alsl-m+2· Thus the 
interval is empty, and ZS" is efficient, only if alsl-m+1 = alsl-m+2. In that case, c(ZS") = 
c(Z~-I) = C(Z~+I); if ZS" is efficient, then so are Z~+l and Z~-l. We repeat the pro cess 
and conclude that if ZS" is optimal, then Z1 and z1s1 are also efficient plans. Therefore, 
among the set of efficient plans, we always have Z1 or z1sl . 
By Lemma 1, we have that if z1s1 is an efficient plan for S, than ZVI is an efficient plan 
for T, with T ç S. By symmetry of the agents, we can extend this result to aIl T such that 
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ITI ~ ISI. Therefore, there exists a kEN such that for ail S ç N containing m ~ k agents, 
the set of efficient plans contains z181 . For aIl S ç N containing m > k agents, the set of 
efficient plans contains Z1 .• 
If (ISI - 1) (al 0) ~ al, then the set of efficient plans for coalition S contains a 
plan where aIl agents are connected directly to the source. If (ISI - 1) (al - 0) 2:: El~12 al, 
then the set of efficient plans for coalition S contains a plan where one agent is connected 
directly to the source and aIl other agents are connected directly to this agent. 
In ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems, agents are ordered according to the 
costs of their direct connection. However, we cao construct a related family of problems 
yielding permutationally concave games by ordering agents according to the costs of indirect 
connections. Formally, we keep the assumption that demands are identical, but we specify 
the following cost structure: for all i,j, kEN, Coi(k) = Coj(k) and a~ = Cij(k) - cij(k - 1). 
We retain that a~ a{i, but costs are now ordered in a lexicographic manner: 
12 < 13 < < ln < 23 < < 2n < < n-1,n ak _ ak _'" _ ak _ ak _'" _ ak _'" _ a k . 
This problem may have limited economic relevance but, in the same manner as for ordered 
quasi-symmetric congestion problems, it can be shown that it generates permutationally 
concave games. 
We can also order agents according to their demands, leaving the rest of the structure 
symmetric. Suppose that (N, Q, ,) is such that for aIl i, j E N, aH x E R.+, Coi(X) = fp(x) and 
Cij(X) fs(x), with !k(O) = 0 and !k concave for k = p,s. Suppose also that'Q1 2:: ... 2:: qn' 
The resulting game is also permutationally concave. 
More generally, while we can add the set of ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems 
and the simple problems of Section 3.2 to the family of stable concave SSUNF problems, the 
family has yet to be fully characterized. 
6 Convex SSUNF games 
In opposition to concave problems, nothing guaraotees on convex problems that there will be 
a tree among the efficient plans. In fact, to avoid the decreasing returns to scale associated 
with the convex cost functions, there is an incentive to split fiows on many arcs. 
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For convex problems, we have an algorithm that approximates an efficient plan. In fact, 
we can approximate the minimal cost as close as wanted, although at the cost of many 
operations. This algorithm is named the cycle-cancelling method and has been extensively 
studied in the operations research literature. See for example Goldberg and Tarjan (1989). 
It has also been mentioned, in a slightly different form, in the economic literature by Quant 
and Reijnierse (2004). 
Here is an overview of the method: starting with a feasible plan Z E F(N, Q) such that 
there are no i, j E N such that Zij > 0 and Zji > 0, we define a marginal cost vector l( Z) 
that assigns the marginal cost lij of one unit of flow on each arc. FormaUy, 
We define a cycle C on plan Z as a path rii(Z) with i E No. We say that C is a negative 
cycle on the network Zif L:(i,j)E8UPP(C) lij(Zij) < O. 
Thus starting with the feasible plan Z, if there are no negative cycles, Z is efficient. 
If there are negative cycles, we pick one at random and define Z' such that z:j = Zij + 1 
if (i, j) E supp( C) and Z~j = Zij otherwise. We calculate l(Z') and continue eliminating 
negative cycles and updating the marginal cost vector until there are no more negative 
cycles. The resulting plan is the approximation of an optimal plan. 
To get a better approximation, we have to define l(Z) as the marginal cost of x units, 
with 0 < x < 1. In problems with a smaU number of agents, once the approximation is 
obtained, one can use this information to infer the direction of the flows (Zij > 0 or Zji > 0) 
and then solve a standard optimization problem to get an exact efficient plan. 
6.1 Stability result 
Before stating the main result of this section, let's first define sorne notation and state a 
Lemma on feasible plans that will be used later on. 
Let À E [0,1]6 be balanced: 
L À S = 1 for aU i E N 
SE6:iES 
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We have the property that a sum of feasible plans over a balanced collection, weighted by 
the vector >.., is a feasible plan for the grand coalition N. Note that this is in no way related 
to the cost structure. 
Lemma 2 For a fixed Q, a balanced >.., and a set of plans ZS such that ZS E F(S, Q) for 
all S E 6, we have, for Z = LSE6 >..SZS, that Z E F(N,Q). 
Proof. We must verify that the resulting plan respects with equalities the conditions (1.1) 
to be a feasible plan. We can see that the first condition is verified: 
LZOi = L >"SLZgi 
iEN SE6 iES 
where the second equality cornes from the fact that ZS E F(S, Q). The last equality cornes 
from the fact that LSE6:iES >..S 1 for every i E N. 
The second condition is also verified. For any i E N, we have: 
L (Zji - Zij) 
iENo\{i} 
L >..s ( L (zJ; -Z~)) 
SE6 iENo\{i} 
L >..S ( L (zJ; - Z~)) 
SE6:iES iENo\{i} 
L >..Sqi 
SE6:iES 
where the second equality cornes from the fact that ZS E F(S, Q). The last equality cornes 
from the fact that >.. is balanced. 
The third condition is trivially satisfied. Therefore, Z E F(N, Q) .• 
The following is an explicit proof of the result announced by Quant et al. (2006). 
Theorem 4 If the cost structure '"Y is such that aU Cij are convex functions, then care( Q, '"Y) 
is non-empty. 
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Proof. Step 1. Fix the problem (N, Q, 'Y) and take a balanced À, and a set of efficient plans 
ZS such that ZS E argminXEF(S,Q) c(X) for aIl 8 E 6. Define Z = l:SE6 À S Zs. 
We have that Cij(Zij) = Cij (l:SE6 ÀSzfj) = Cij (l:SE6:i,jE So ÀSzti) since by definition 
of the game, for (i,j) E A, the arc (i,j) can only be used by the coalition 8 if i,j E 8 0 . 
By definition of a balanced collection, l:SE6:iES ÀS = 1 for every i E N. We have that 
l:SE6:i,jE So À
S 
::; l:SE6:iES ÀS = 1 for aIl i E N and aIl j E 80 . 
Define (3ij = 1 -l:SE6:i,jE So À
S 
Therefore: 
We also have that l:SE6 ÀSCij (zti) = l:SE6:i,jE So ÀSCij (zti) since ifi or j is not in 80 , we 
must have zfj = 0 and Cij (0) = o. We then have that 
L ÀSCij (zfj) = L ÀSCij (zfj) + (3ij Cij(O) 
SE6 SE6:i,jESo 
since Cij (0) = O. 
By the convexity of the cost functions 
Thus, 
::; L ÀSCij (zfj) for aIl (i,j) E A. (1.8) 
SE6 
Step 2. We have 
c(Z) L Cij(Zij) 
(i,j)EA 
L Cij (L ÀSz~) 
(i,j)EA SES 
< L L ÀSCij(Z~) 
(i,j)EA SES 
L L ÀSCij(Z~) 
SES (i,j)EA 
L ÀSc(ZS) 
SES 
where the inequality follows from equation (1.8). 
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Step 3. Let Z* be an efficient plan for the problem (N, Q, ,): Z* E arg minZEF(N,Q) c(Z). 
By lemma 2, Z E F(N, Q). Then c(Z*) :s; c(Z). 
Since c(Z) :s; LSES ÀSc(ZS), we have that: 
which is the condition to have a balaneed game. 
Sinee agame is balanced if and only if the core is non-empty (Bondareva (1963), Shapley 
(1967)), the pro of is complete .• 
The non-emptiness of the core in this case might seem counter-intuitive at first, sinee 
convex cost functions generate decreasing returns to scale. However, the gains in cooperation 
stem from the fact that a larger coalition will have more arcs on which to split flows and in 
this way limit the damage caused by the decreasing returns to scale. Sinee it is never optimal 
for a coalition to use both arcs (i,j) and (j, i), the number of us able arcs for a coalition 8 
is 181 + ~ for 181 > 1. Thus, for 181 = 1,2,3,4, ... the number of usable arcs is 1,3,6,16, ... 
In aU convex problems, this is sufficient to generate enough cooperation gains to guarantee 
a non-empty core. 
However, the game resulting from a convex problem need not be a concave game, as 
illustrated by this example: 
Example 5 (N,Q,,) is a convex problem with N = {1,2,3}, Q = (1,2,5), COl(X) = x 2, 
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C02(X) = 4x2, C03(X) lOx2, C12(X) C21(X) 2x2, C13(X) C31(X) 5X2, C23(X) 
C32 (X) = 50x2. 
We can easily find that C({l} ,Q,,) = 1, C({2} ,Q,,) = 16, C({3} ,Q,,) = 250. 
Using the cycle-cancelling method and then solving a standard optimization problem, we 
find that C({1,2},Q,,) = 10 (with ZÔl = 2 and ZÔ2 = ZÎ2 = 1) and C({1,3},Q,,) 
100,9375 with (ZOI = 65/16, Z03 = 31/16, Zi3 = 49/16). 
For the grand coalition (1,2,3), we get C(N, Q,,) = 111,1173. We have 
C ( {l, 2} , Q, ,) - C ( {1} , Q, ,). = 9 < 10, 1798 = C( N, Q, ,) - C ( {l, 3} , Q, ,) 
and thus the game is not concave. 
Here, agent 2 gains by joining agent 1 because he then has access to arcs with cheaper 
cost functions. However, wh en he joins coalition {l, 3}, agent 3 has created congestion on arc 
(0,1), while making available arcs (0,3), (1,3) and (3,2) that are costly. Thus, cooperations 
gains for agent 2 decrease. 
7 Conclusion 
Starting from a single-source uncapacitated network flow problem, we defined agame that 
associates to each coalition the minimal cost to supply aU of its agents with their demand, 
while using only nodes contained within the coalition. 
In the case where the cost functions are concave, we offered new examples showing that 
the problem can have a non-empty core. We looked at simpler problems that always have non-
empty cores. In particular, we introduced the ordered quasi-symmetric congestion problems, 
that always generate stable games. A complete characterization of the family of concave 
problems with non-empty cores has yet to be found. 
We also offered an explicit proof of the stability of convex SSUNF problems, a result 
mentioned by Quant et al. (2006). However the resulting game might not be a concave 
game, leaving open the question of the characterization of the core elements. 
Chapter 2 
Cost sharing with multiple technologies 
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1 Introduction 
In cost sharing problems, agents cooperate and combine their demands, at a cost. The central 
planner's main task is then to divide that cost among the participating agents. 
In their simplest form, cost sharing problems have in common the following char acter-
istics: agents demand different levels of a homogeneous private good and have access to a 
commonly owned technology to pro duce this good. With this technology, we can associate 
a cost to any level of demand. The gains (or los ses ) associated with cooperation arise from 
the varying returns to scale exhibited by the technology. However, we argue that in many 
cases, at least part of the gains from cooperation derive from the presence of other agents, 
regardless of their levels of demand. 
The motivating example is the formation of a network, where a coalition can only use the 
locations of its members to build its network. As a coalition grows, more efficient networks 
can be built as the number of possible network configurations increases, yielding gains from 
cooperation. 
Another clear example is when agents have privately-owned technologies of production. 
When agents cooperate, in addition to combining their demands, they also combine their 
technologies. A possibly complex pro cess aggregates these technologies to form a new efficient 
technology for the coalition. In particular, technologies can be complementary, in which case 
aIl agents enjoy gains from this technology sharing. 
We find many examples of such cooperation in environmental problems. Consider the 
case of the Kyoto Protocol that came into force on February 16th, 2005. Under its terms, 
participating countries have until 2012 to reach reduction targets on greenhouse gases emis-
sions. Countries that have not reached their targets can buy emission credits from other 
countries that have exceeded their target reductions. 
Countries that signed the protocol were assigned individual targets but are free to regroup 
with other countries. If they choose to do so, emissions must be reduced within the zone 
without regard to where in the zone the reductions are made. This cooperation allows 
countries to cooperate technologically, to coordinate their programs and to create larger 
markets for their firms to trade emission credits. More importantly, it allows a more efficient 
allocation of reductions, to where it is less costly to do so. Countries of the European Union 
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have regrouped in such a manner. For example, both Germany and Spain had to reduce 
their emissions by 8%, compared to 1990 levels, under the Kyoto Proto col. However, the EU 
assigned a target of -21% to Germany and +15% to Spain. 
While the United States are not part of the Kyoto Protocol, sorne of its states have 
adopted legislations to reduce greenhouses gases. In 1997, Oregon introduced a legislation 
that requires newly-constructed or expanded power plants to meet standards in C02 emis-
sions. If they fail to meet standards, they must pay an amount of $0.85 per pound in excess. 
Alternatively they can finance, alone or with partners, a project that will at least offset the 
excess emissions. Similar legislations have been adopted in Massachusetts and Washington 
and are under study in other states. 
Consider the following example: 
Example 1 Two firms from Oregon have plans for new power plants that do not meet the 
standards. Meeting the standards would prove too costly for both firms. Under current plans, 
firm 1 would have excess emissions of Xl = 15 million pounds. For firm 2, excess emissions 
would be of X2 = 10 million pounds. 
They have privately-owned technologies for offset projects and we suppose that there are 
no outside firms with whom they can form a parlnership. The technology of firm 1 is such 
that in its offset project, its average (and marginal) cost per pound of emission is Cl = $0.60. 
Firm 2 has some technology for an offset project, but finds it more profitable to pay the fine. 
Thus C2 = 0.85$. However, if they cooperate, their technologies are complements and average 
cost falls to Cl2 = $0.40. 
Firms are responsible for their technologies, that result from past investments in R8D. 
Demands are inelastic as firms must comply with the law. 
Cost sharing problems are usually studied with cost functions that assign to each level of 
demand a cost, that is 0: X f---> O(x) where X is the level of demand. Clearly, this structure is 
inappropriate for this problem. In this example, the structure is more complex, as the same 
level of demand can generate different costs depending on who pro duces it. The correct 
model assumes that 0 : (x, S) f---> O(x, S) is defined for any demand level x and any coalition 
S. 
In our example we have 0(25, {1}) = $15M, 0(25, {2}) = $21.25M and 0(25, {l, 2}) = 
$lOM, so for a given level of demand, the cost depends on who cooperates in its production. 
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In practice, teclmology plays an important role in many situations of cooperation. Re-
search joint ventures are the obvious exampIes, where cooperation can improve efficiency of 
the research even without increasing investment (La Manna (2006». One can aIso think 
of countries cooperating in a space agency, or different departments of a company not only 
putting together their requests for a project, but also sorne of the workers and tools they 
have at their disposaI to complete the task. 
Teclmology is defined here in the broadest sense. Possible definitions of technology sharing 
in our context inc1ude the sharing of experience, lists of suppliers or negotiation powers. 
The assumption that agents share private technologies' has been used in the output-
sharing literature, where agents combine their inputs and where the task is .to allocate the', 
output among the participants. Leroux (2007) studies a problem where the technology to be 
shared results from the aggregation of private production processes .. He focuses on Incentives 
issues, whereas we study fairness. 
By integrating technologies, we are . able to characterize cost sharing mies using new 
properties related to the effects of teclmology on gains from cooperation. While models 
where costs depend on demands could be studied by looking only at totaI coalition costs, 
using the extra information contained in the cost· function allows us to focus on different 
properties. In the same manner, we could ignore technological cooperation. However, this 
extra· information can be used, as gains from coopèration now arise from different sources. 
In fact, with technology sharing, there are two ways to create cooperation gains; one related 
to demand and the other to technology. Revisiting Example 1 will highlight this feature. 
Example 1 revisited. Everything is as in Example 1, except that tiJhen firms 1 and 2 
cooperate, we have that the average cost is Cl2 = Cl = $0.60. 
Cost for firm 1: CIXI = $9M. 
Cost fo~ firm 2: C2X2 = $8.5M 
Total cost (with cooperation): Cl (Xl + X2)= $15M 
Therefore, there is a cooperation gain of c}x} +C2X2~CI (Xl +X2) (C2 CJ)X2 = $2.5M. 
The cooperation gain cornes from the fact that cooperation allows production of the 10 
units of firm 2 at a lower marginal cOst. Therefore, we can c1early identify two sources for 
this gain: 1) the technology improvement that we can attribute to'firm 1, and 2) the level 
of agent 2's demand,which allows this new technology to be ap})lied on a larger scale. 
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The Shapley value splits the gain in half and gives allocations of $7.75M to firm 1 and 
$7.25M to firm 2. While the Shapley value is a good predictor of what could happen if the 
two were allowed to bargain for this gain, in this case, it is difficult from' a normative point 
of view to accept the proposed allocation. In fact, here, we have the unattractive feature 
that firm 2 gets a strictly positive share of the cooperation gain because it is polluting. 
In this example, it is natural to dismiss this second type of contribution and to put aIl 
weight on the technology improvement as the source of the cooperation gain. We would then 
allocate no part of the gain to firm 2. 
More generally, if an agent can be added to any (non-empty) coalition without ever 
improving the technology of that coalition, then he should be allocated no part of the coop-
eration gain and should pay his stand-alone cost. This will be the central axiom used in the 
paper, that we will calI the Technological Dummy property. 
In more general problems, this property is not always desirable, notably when agents are 
not completely responsible for their technology (for example if it is a physical skill). However, 
when we are close to the conditions of the previous example, or more generally when we put 
a lot of weight on rewarding technology, the property is natural. 
This property is a close relative of the familiar Dummy property in the classic cost sharing 
literature, that says that if an agent can be added to any coalition at no extra cost, then 
this agent should not pay anything. This property was introduced in the original paper by 
Shapley (1953) where it was one of the main equity postulates. It conveys the simple ide a 
that agents should not pay for costs for which they are not responsible. They are, therefore, 
fully responsible for the costs of their demands. This property has been adapted to models 
with continuous demands. In that context, it implies that if there is an agent such that 
adding one unit of his good to any demand profile can be done at no extra cost, then this 
agent should not pay anything. See Moulin and Sprumont (2006) for a discussion of the 
implications of this property and a comparison to properties yielding partial responsibility. 
Conceptually, the property is even closer to the stronger Separability property for a 
model with continuous demands for differentiated goods. This property says that if there is 
an agent such that the extra cost of adding one unit of his good to any demand profile is 
always equal to a, then this agent should paya times his demand. In that case, there is never 
any gain related to scale when the agent joins a coalition and the property imposes that he 
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is not credited with any cooperation gain. This property does not add anything new in the 
model with publicl)'-owned technology and continuous demands as it is implied by the usual 
properties of Additivity, Non-negativity and the classic Dummy property. The cost sharing 
rules satisfying these properties have been characterized by Friedman (2004) and Haimanko 
(2000). See Wang (1999) for the case with indivisible demands and Weber (1988) for the 
case of the stand-alone game. 
Combined with adaptations of classic properties of linearity (on both demands and tech-
nologies) and symmetry, the Technological Dummy property generates a well-defined class 
of cost sharing rules. We then define a pro pert y of monotonicity in the technology and the 
classic stand-alone property. It turns out that any one of these properties, in combinat ion 
with the four mentioned before, is sufficient to characterize a unique rule, that we call the 
technological contribution value. 
This rule is as follows. For each agent i, we define a game on the set of agents other than 
i. Each coalition is assigned the change in average cost when it joins agent i. The Shapley 
value is then applied to this game, and multiplied by the demand of agent i, to express a 
created value. An agent is allocated this created value in the different games, to which we 
add his stand-alone cost. 
We also characterize a rule, named the quasi-average contribution rule, using the No 
Reshuffiing property. This property says that no coalition should have an incentive to real-
locate demand among its members in order to reduce their aggregate cost share. We first 
build agame where the cost of a coalition is its co st to produce the whole vector of demand, 
using its technology. The Shapley value is applied to this game to share the technological 
gains. Then, individual shares are adjusted according to the difference between individual 
and average demands. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formally defines the framework. Section 3 
presents the characterization of the set of rules satisfying the Technological Dummy property 
and a set of basic properties. In Section 4, we offer two characterizations for one of these 
rules, the technological contribution value. In Section 5, we define and characterize the quasi-
average contribution rule using the No Reshuffiing property. Section 6 discusses possible 
extensions. Existence and independence of properties are proven in the appendix. 
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2 The model 
Let N {l, ... , n} be the set of agents. Let N = {S 1 0 =1= S ç N} be the set of non-empty 
subsets of N, Le., the set of possible, non-empty coalitions. Agents have demands for a single, 
common good. Let x E lR:';' be the demand vector. Demands are assumed to be inelastic. If 
SEN and x E lR:';', write x(S) Xi. 
The technology for producing the good varies with the set of participating agents, but is 
assumed to be always linear. By making this assumption, we can foc us on the implications 
of technology sharing, as no part of the cooperation gains arise from returns to scale. Let 
r {c E lR:11 s ç T => c(S) ~ c(T)} be the set of cost vectors. c(S) denotes the (constant) 
marginal cost of coalition S. Therefore, marginal cost does not increase when a coalition 
grows. The total cost for coalition S is thus c(S)x(S). 
A problem is an ordered pair (c, x) E r x lR:';'; that is, the cost and demand vectors. 
A rule is a map y : r x lR:';' lRN satisfying the budget balance condition LiEN Yi(C, x) = 
c(N)x(N). Note that since c(S)x(S) can decrease when we add agents to coalition S, we do 
not impose that Yi ~ O. There is ample justification in this setting to subsidize an agent if 
he allows other agents to significantly improve on their technologies. 
3 The implications of the Technological Dummy Prop-
erty 
The Technological Dummy property, discussed in the introduction, is a powerful axiom. To 
define it formally, we need the following definition: 
For any c E r, if c(Su {i}) = c(S) for aU 0 =1= S ç N\ {i} , we say that i is a technological 
dummy in c. 
Technological Dummy property: For any c E rand any x E lR:';', if i E N is a 
technological dummy in c, then Yi(C,X) = c({i})Xi' 
We combine the Technological Dummy property with a symmetry property, as weIl as 
two linearity properties. 
We use a weak form of symmetry, such that if two agents are completely identical, both in 
their demands and in how they influence the technology, they are allocated the same amount. 
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Equal Shares for Equals: For any c E r, any x E IR~ and any i, j E N, if c(S u {i}) = 
c(S U {j}) for aIl S ç N\ {i,j} and Xi Xj, then Yi(C, x) = Yj(c,x). 
The next two properties have no apparent ethical content, but prevent problems coming 
from manipulation and allow easy implementation. 
The first property is along the lines of the classic Additivity property that is standard in 
the literature (see Moulin (2002)). With the following property, if we compute cost shares on 
the problem (c,x), but technology changes to c' c + 5, then adding the cost shares on the 
problem (5, x) or computing them again on (c', x) 'will yield the same results. In our context, 
without the assumption of non-negativity of the cost shares, we use the stronger property 
that the ru le be linear in the cost vector. 1 
Technological Linearity: For any x E IR~ and any Cl, CZ E r, PI'PZ E IR, such that 
PICI + pzcz Er, Y(PIC1 + PzCZ,x) = PIY(Cl,X) + pzY(CZ,x). 
We will also use a similar property for demand. Suppose that agents have agreed on 
the cost sharing method and shares are computed using the demand vector x. If demands 
increase to x' = x+5, we can e,ither add the cost shares obtained when using 5 as the demand 
vector or compute directly the cost shares using x'. Because of the assumption of constant 
returns to scale, the property is not particularly strong. In fact, without it, agents could 
manipulate their cost shares through the demand vector. 
Demand Linearity: For any c Er, xl, XZ E IR~ and ).1, ).2 E IR+, y( c, ).1 Xl + À2XZ) 
ÀIY(C,XI) +À2Y(C,X2). 
Together, these four properties characterize a well-defined set of rules. 
3.1 Characterization 
First, note that for any problem with only two agents, the Technological Dummy property and 
Technological Linearity are sufficient to characterize a unique rule, with no symmetry axiom 
needed. To see this, observe that any c E r can be written as the sum of two technological 
vectors Cl and c2 such that one agent is a technological dummy in cl and the other agent 
is a technological dummy in c2 • There are many ways to do this, one simple way being to 
define Cl such that Cl ( {i} ) c({i}) - c({1,2}) and cl ({2}) = cl ({1,2}) O. We then 
define CZ C Cl. The Technological Dummy property, combined with the budget-balance 
1 In standard models, Linearity is used in most proofs. However, Linearity is implied by Additivity under 
the assumption that cost shares are non-negative. 
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condition, defines a unique rule on cl and c2 . By Technological Linearity (in fact a weaker 
property of additivity is sufficient), we have also defined a unique rule on c. 
However, on problems with larger sets of agents, the budget-balance condition together 
with the Technological Dummy property will not yield a unique rule. 
Before moving on, we need to define marginal contributions rules, for which co st alloca-
tions depend linearly on those marginal contributions. 
For a set of agents N, let v be a function that assigns a value to all 8 E N. Let Z E ]RN 
be a rule such that L:iEN Zi(V) = v(N). We say that Z is a marginal contributions rule with 
weight p, if for all i E N, Zi(V) = L:0#5<;:;N\{i}Pi(8) [v(8U {i}) - v(8)] + Pi(0)v({i}), with 
Pi E ]R2N-l and P = (Pi)iEN . 
We are now ready to introduce the family of rules satisfying the four properties defined 
above. The characterization is obtained in the following manner: by Demand Linearity, we 
can allocate the cost of each unit of demand independently. By Technological Linearity and 
the Technological Dummy property, the rule to share the cost of one unit of demand of agent i 
is a marginal contributions rule, for all i E N. Equal Shares for Equals and the Technological 
Dummy property impose restrictions on the weights of the marginal contributions rules. The 
first steps follow closely Weber (1988), who then characterizes the Shapley value. 
Theorem 1 A mie y satisfies the Technological Dummy property, Technological Linearity, 
Demand Linearity and Equal Shares for Equals if and only if it is of the following form: for 
all kEN, Yk(C,X) = L:iENXi7)~(C) with 7)i(.) a marginal contributions mie with weightpi , 
such that, for all j E N\ {i} 
and 
p;(0) 
p;(8) 
p;(8U{i}) 
p~(0) 
p~(8) 
p~(N\{i}) 
o 
(J151 for all 0 =1= 8 ç N\ {i, j} 
181!(n -181- 2)! _ (J , li 8 C N\ { .. } (n _ 1)! 151 Jor a - ~,J 
1 
181 (J151-1 - (n -181- 1) (J151 for all0 =1= 8 C N\ {i}. 
(n - 1)On-2 
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While Theorem 1 wiII serve as a lemma in the foIIowing sections, it is by itself instructive, 
as it clearly identifies the restrictions imposed by the four properties. The proof is in the 
appendix. 
Rules defined in Theorem 1 differ only in how they respond to the following question: If 
agent j is the only one with a positive demand, when computing the cost allocation of agent 
i, what weight should be put on his marginal technological contributions to coalitions that 
do not include agent j (Le. what should () be)? 
4 The technological contribution value 
We define a new rule caUed the technological contribution value and denote it by y* . 
Fix a problem (c,x). For every i E N, define the function vi(.,c) as foHows: 
Vies, c) c( {S U i}) c({i}) for each S ç N\ {i}. 
The function ViC c) is a TU-game on the player set N\ {i} . Given the problem (c, x), it gives, 
for each coalition not containing i, the change in the marginal co st when a coalition joins 
agent i. Notice that since c(S) ~ c(T) for aU S ç T ç N, we have that vi(S,c) ~ vi(T,c) for 
any S ç T ç N\ {i} and vi(S,c) :::; 0 for aIl S ç N\ {i}, aIl i EN and aH c Er. 
The technological contribution value of the problem (c, x) is given by 
yi(c, x) c({i})Xi + L xjShi(Vi(.,c)), 
jEN\{i} 
for all i E N, where Sh(vj(·,c)) is the Shapley value ofthe game vj(·,c). 
Thus, for agent i, c( {i} )Xi is the maximum amount he can pay. This amount will be 
reduced by his share of the value created by the technological improvements generated for 
other agents. For each agent j =1= i, the share aHocated to agent i is his Shapley value on the 
game vi multiplied by the demand of agent j. 
In the representation of Theorem 1, the technological contribution value is the rule such 
that () = (0, ... ,0). To see this, suppose that x is such that Xk = 1 and Xi 0 for all i E 
N\ {k} . Then, yj (c, x) Shj( vk (., c)) = ESÇN\{j,k} ISI!(~-=!;)I!-2)! [c(S U {j, k}) - c(S U {k} )]. 
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k( ) k( {}) ISI!(n-ISI-2)! \ { } This implies that Pj S = 0 and Pj Su j =. -(n"':l)! for all 0 of- S ç N j, k ,and 
therefore that () = (0, 000,0)0 
We offer two characterizations of the technological contribution value, each obtained by 
adding one additional axiom to the four presented in the previous sectiono 
From the definition of the technological contribution value, c( {i} )Xi is the upper-bound 
of what agent i can payo The classic stand-alone property requires that no agent should 
be allocated more than c( {i} )Xi, his stand-alone costo Since c is anti-monotonic, this is a 
meaningful property in our contexto It is a minimal stability property that makes sure that 
no one pre fers to leave unilaterally the coalition No 
Stand-alone property: For any cE r, x E lR~ and i E N, Yi(C,X)::; c({i})Xi 
The technological contribution value, because of the properties of the Shapley value, also 
satisfies a monotonicity propertyo That is, starting from a cost vector c Er, if the average 
cost decreases for a coalition Sand stays the same for all other coalitions, then if an agent 
is part of S, he should not see his cost share increase following this change 0 The property is 
similar in nature to the various definitions of coalitional monotonicity first defined by Young 
(1985) 0 
Technological Monotonicity: For any i E N, if c, c' E rare such that there is a 
S ç N\{i} with c(SU {il) > c'(SU {il) and c(T) = c'(T) for aIl T of- Su {i}, then 
Yi (c, x) 2 Yi (c' , x) for any x E lR~ 0 
With these properties, we are ready for the main characterization resultso 
Theorem 2 A rule Y satisfies the Technological Dummy property, Technological Linearity, 
Demand Linearity, Equal Shares for Equals and the Stand alone property if and only if 
Y = y*o 
Proof. Lemma 1 (in appendix) shows that y* satisfies the five propertieso We show that 
they imply a unique ruleo 
Fix i E No For each S ç N and k ::; ISI , we define a cost vector c~ such that coalitions 
that are part of S and have no more than k members have an average cost of 1, with aIl other 
coalitions having an average cost of 00 Formally, let c~ be such that c~ (T) = 1 if T ç Sand 
ITI ::; k, and 0 otherwiseo By Theorem 1, Yi(c;:_l,ei ) = 1- p~(N\ {il) = 1- (n -1)()n_2o 
Since c:;_l({i}) = 1, by the Stand-alone property, Yi(c:;_l,ei ) = 1- (n -1){)n-2 ::; 1 and 
therefore ()n-2 2 00 
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Suppose that for k E {2, 000' n - 2} we have shown that fh ~ 00 We show that it implies 
fh-1 ~ 00 
By Theorem 1, 
1 - 2: p~(S) 
SÇN\{i} 
ISI=k 
(n - 1)! 0 
-0 1 - k!(n _ k _ 1)! [k(h-1 - (n - k - 1)(h] 0 
Sinee cf ( {i} ) = 1, by the Stand-alone property, 
Ni· (n-l)! 
Yi(ek ,e ) = 1 - k!(n _ k _ 1)! [kBk-1 - (n - k - l)Bk] ~ 1 
and therefore (n - k - I)Bk ~ kBk- 1o By the induction argument, Bk ~ 0, whieh aUows us to 
eonclude that Bk-1 ~ 00 Therefore, Bk ~ 0 for aU k E {1, 000, n - 2} 0 
By Theorem 1, 
L p~(S) 
SÇN\{i} 
ISI:::::k 
~ (n-l)! 
- ~ l!(n -l _ 1)! [Uil-1 - (n -l - I)Bd 
1=1 
for any k ~ n - 1. Developing the terms, we obtain that Yi(e~\{i}, ei ) = k!(I;:~~~!2)!Bko Sinee 
e~\{i} ({i}) = 0, by the Stand-alone property, Yi(e~\{i}, ei ) = k!(t;:~k1r2)!Bk ~ 0 and therefore 
Bk ~ 0 for aU k E {1, 000' n - 2} 0 
Combining the previous results, we obtain that B = [0,0, 000,0]0 • 
Theorem 3 A rule y satisfies the Technological Dummy properly, Technologieal Linearity, 
Demand Linearity, Equal Shares for Equals and Teehnologieal Monotonieity if and only if 
y = y*o 
Proof. Lemma 1 (in appendix) shows that y* satisfies the five propertieso We show that 
they imply a unique mleo 
Fix i E N and take a S ç N\ {i} 0 Suppose that e, c' E rare sueh that e(T) = c' (T) 
for aU T =J Su {i} and e(S U {i}) < e'(S U {i})o By Teehnologieal Monotonicity, we must 
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have Yi(C,ei) :S Yi(C',ei), which can be written as Yi(C',ei)- Yi(c,ei ) ?: O. By Theorem 1, 
Yi(C', ei ) Yi(C, ei) = p~(S) [c'(S U {i}) - c(S U {il )]. We therefore need pHS) ?: 0 for aH 
S ç N\ {i}. 
Looking at the form of pHS) in Theorem 1, this is only possible if B [0,0, ... , 0]. To see 
this, note that for i 1: k, pH {k}) = -(n - ISI - l)th. We therefore need BI :S O. However, 
for i,j,k distinct, pH{j,k}) = 2Bl - (n - 3)B2 , which implies that O2 :S O. Note also that 
pHS) ISI BISI - 1 (n -ISI- 1) BISI for all S c N\ {il, which implies Bk :S 0 for aH 
k = 1, ... ,n 2. However, p~(N\ {il) = (n -1)Bn - 2 • Since we must have p~(N\ {i})?: 0, we 
need Bn-2 ?: O. This is only possible if B = [0,0, ... ,0]. • 
Following the terminology of 'Weber (1988), we say that a marginal contributions rule z 
with weight p is a probabilistic value if, for aIl i E N 
2:: Pi(S) 1 
S<;::N\{i} 
Pi(S) ?: ° for aIl S ç N\ {i}. 
In aIl rules y defined in Theorem 1, y was a weighted sum of marginal contributions 
rules that satisfied the first condition above but not necessarily the second one. Following 
the proof of Theorem 3, it is clear that the technological contribution value is the only rule 
among the set defined in Theorem 1 that is a weighted sum of probabilistic values. 
5 No reshufHing and the quasi-average contribution rule 
While the technological contribution value has nice properties, we can look at rules defined in 
Theorem 1 that satisfy different properties. We now focus on a non-manipulability property 
violated by the technological contribution value, the No Reshuffiing property. This property 
says that the aggregate cost share of agents in S should depend only on their aggregate 
demand x(S). A rule that does not satisfy the No Reshuffiing property could be the subject 
of manipulation. Agents in S cou Id reshuffie their individual demands within S, perform side 
transfers and possibly benefit from the operation. 
This property was introduced by Moulin (1987) in a bankruptcy mode!. A Iso , it was used 
by Sprumont (2005) to characterize the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing 
ruie. 
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No Reshuffling: For any x, x' E ]RN and SEN, if x(S) x'(S) and Xi = x~ for aU 
i E N\S, then LjESYj(C,x) = LjESYj(C,x') for all C Er. 
Among the rules defined in Theorem 1, the rule y', called the quasi-average contribution 
T'Ule, is the only one satisfying No Reshuffiing. It is defined as follows. 
For il. problem (c,x), define ë = LSEN(-I)ISI+l c(S). Then, define c! E ]R2 N such that 
C'(0) = ë and c/(S) = c(S) for all SEN. Then, for all i EN, YHc,x) = Cxi + Shi(C/)X(N). 
Alternatively, for each i E N, ë = c({i}) + LIO~SÇN\{i}(-I)ISI [c(S U {il) c(S)]. Then, for 
all i E N, y~(c,x) = ë [Xi - xC:)] + Shi(c)x(N). 
We thus start by computing the Shapley value of the game generated by the technologi-
cal function c applied to the whole demand. We then adjust cost allocations by comparing 
demands to the average demand, and applying the difference to ë. As seen in the first repre-
sentation, ë can be viewed as the freely available technology. 
We can see that LiES y~(c, x) = cx(S) + x(N) LiES Shi(C) - ~cx(N). The aggregate 
cost share of S depends only on x(S) and x(N). 
The quasi-average contribution ru le is the ru le in Theorem 1 such that Ok = k!(n-;-'7- 1)! + 
n 
for all k E {1, ... ,n-2}. To see this, recall that 0lsi P}(S) for i 1= j and S ç 
N\ {i, j} . P} (S) Îs the weight put on the term Xi c( Su {j}) in the allocatio~ of agent j. Since 
Shj(c/)x(N) = x(N) [ '" ISI1 (n - ISI 
L...J n! 
0~SÇN\{j} 
1)! 1 1 (c(S U {j} - c(S)) + ~ (c( {j}) - ë) , 
the term XiC(SU{j}) appears twice: first multiplied by J,;;;.J.;.:>.:.:-.p......::.J..:. and a second time in the 
term.! (c( {j}) - ë)). Putting this together, we obtain that PJi.(S) = ISI!(n-I,SI-l)! + (_1)l s l+1 = 
n n. n 
Theorem 4 A rule y satisfies the Technological Dummy property, Technological Linearity, 
Demand Linearity, Equal Shares for Equals and No Reshuffling if and only if y = y'. 
Proof. Lemma 2 (in appendix) shows that y' satisfies the five properties. We show that 
they imply a unique ruIe. 
Fix a technological vector c and i, j E N. By Theorem 1, 
p~(S)[c(SU{k}) c(S)] +p~(0)c({k}). 
0~SÇN\{k} 
, 
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We. consider the possible reshuffiing of the demands of agents i and j. We have that 
Yi(C, ei) + Yj(c,ei ) = 7J~(c) + 7J~(c} = L:0;<st;;N W{i,j}(S)c(S), where wkn(S)E IR is the 
weight assigned to c( S) in the allocations of {i, j} wheil i has aIl the demand. Formally, sinee 
7J~ = L:0;<st;;N\ {k} p~(S) [c(S U {k}) - c(S)] + p~(0)c( {k}), we have, for all S ç N\ {i, j}, 
that 
wkn(S) 
W{i,j}(SU {il) 
wkn(S U {i}) 
wkn(SU {i,j}) 
-p!(S) - p}(S) 
p!(S) - p}(Su {il) 
-p~(S U {i}) + p}(S) 
. p~(SU {j}) +p}(SU {il). 
One possible reshuffiing is to shift demand to agent j. No Reshuffiing imposes that 
Yi(c,ei ) + Yj(c,ei ) = Yi(c,ej )+ Yj(c,ej ). It clearly imposes thatwkn(S) = W1i,j}(S) for 
ail 0 =1- S ç N. 
Let S = {il. Then, by Theorem 1, wkn({i}) = pH0) - p}({i}) 
w1i,n({i}) = p{(0) - ~({i}) = (n - 2)01 • We obtain that 01 = n~l' 
1 - _1_ while 
n-l 
Let S ç N\ {i} be such that i E Sand ISI 2: 2. Then, by Theorem 1, W{i,n(S) = 
pHS\ {i}) - p}(S) = (ISI - 1) 0lsl-2 -(n-ISI-l)Olsl_l - (lsl-l(~(n~)I!sl-l)! while W1i,j} (S) = 
p{(S\ {i})"": p~(S) = 0lsl-l -ISI 0lsl-l + (n -ISI-l)Olsl' This can be rewritten as 
Since 00 = 0 and 01 = n~l' we can proceed recursively to finda unique value for. aIl Ok, 
k = 2, : .. n - 2 .• 
While the facts that (2.1) yields a unique value for Band that y' satisfies the properties 
of Theorem 4 are sufficient for the proof, it is illustrative to show. that the 0 associated 
with y' and given at the beginning of this section is compatible with (2.1). Let A(S) = 
(ISI- 1)0Isl-2 - (n - 2ISI)0lsl_1 - (n -ISI-l)Olsl' take an S that hasan even number of 
members and replace in (2.1) to obtain 
A(S) (ISI- 1) 
~(n _ 21SI) [(ISI- l)~~n -ISI)! + ~] (n -ISI 1) [ISI! (n -n~SI - 1)! 
= (ISI- 1) (ISI- 2)! (n -ISI + 1)! _ (n 21SI) (ISI- 1)! (n -ISI)! 
n! n! 
-en ISI 
~! [(ISI 
1 
1'---'--'---'-"---'- - [(ISI 1) + n 21S1 (n ISI - 1)] 
n 
1)! (n ISI + 1)! (n 21SI) (ISI-l)! (n :-ISI)! 1 
-en -ISI 1) ISI! (n ISI 1)! 
= (ISI- 1)!(n -ISI- 1)! [ (n -ISI + 1) (n ISI) (n 21SI) (n -ISI) 1 
n! . -en -ISI- 1) ISI 
(ISI - 1)!(n -ISI- 1)! 
n! n 
(ISI - 1)!(n -ISI- 1)! 
(n - 1)! 
6 Discussions and' ext~nsions 
6.1 Linearity 
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The Technological Linearity property imposes structure on the admissible set of ruIes, aIlow-
ing the complete characterization of Theorem 1. While the benefit.is important, it comes at 
a cost, as we lose fair non-linear rules. Consider the following fairness property: 
Proportional Shares for Symmetric Technology: If ISI ITI implies c(S) c(T) 
then Yi(C,X) = C(N)Xi for aIl i E N and x E IR+'. 
The property states that if aIl agents are symmetric with respect to the technology vector, 
then the cost should he split in proportion to demand. 
No rule satisfies Proportional Shares for Symmetric Technolngy,· Technological Dummy 
and Technological Linearity. To see this, consider the vector eN\{i} ;;;uch that eN\{i}(S) = 1 
if S ~ N\ {i} and 0 otherwise. Agents in N\ {i} are technological dummies in eN \ {i}. By 
Technological Dummy and budget balance, we have, for any xE R+,'Yj(eN\{i} ;x) Xj for aIl 
j i= i and Yi(CN\{i} , x) = -x(N\ {i}). Next, consider the costvector Cl = eN\ {i}. Then, 
e'(S) = n-ISI for aIl 0 i= S ~ N. By Proportional Shares for Symmetric Technology, we have 
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Yi(C',X) = O. However, by Technological Linearity, we have Yi(C',X) = LjENYi(CN\{j},x) = 
(n -1)xi - x(N\ {il) which in general is not equal to O. 
With Technological Linearity, a rule satisfying Technological Dummy will give credits to 
an agent for the savings his technology generates for the other agents. These savings depend 
on the demands ofthose agents. This makes it incompatible with Proportional Shares for 
Symmetric Technology, where an agent's share depends only on his own demand in the case 
where technologies are symmetric. 
However, in itself, Technological Dummy and Proportional Shares for Symmetric Tech-
nology are not incompatible. For example, one can build the following rule: 
_ { ypr(c, x) if c(S) = c(T) when ISI = ITI 
y(c, x) = 
y* (c, x) otherwise 
where ypr is the proportional rule. Alternatively, one could replace y* by any rule from 
Theorem 1, and y would satisfy Technological Dummy and Proportional Shares for Sym-
metric Technology, as weIl as Demand Linearity and Equal Shares for Equals. The family of 
rules satisfying these four properties would however contain many other rules. A complete 
characterization has yet to be obtained without Technological Linearity. 
6.2 Returns to scale 
The model presented here is obviously simple, as it assumes constant returns to scale and 
deals with non-differentiated goods. We used this model to show the fundamental differences 
when dealing with technology sharing and how the Technological Dummy property restricts 
the set of potential rules. The most general model would have a cost function C(S,x) that 
assigns a cost to each coalition Sand each possible profile of demand x E lR~, where C(S, x) 
represents the cost of producing x using the technology of coalition S. 
Without the constant returns to scale assumption, Demand Linearity loses its appeal. 
We then have two different effects on cost: the technology sharing effect, but also the returns 
to scale effect. Since it seems a challenge to separate those effects, it is not clear how 
to apply the idea of the Technological Dummy property in that context. A weak version 
could apply the Technological Dummy principle only when there are constant returns to 
scale and homogeneous goods. FormaIly, if there exists a fun ct ion c : N --+ lR+ such that 
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C(S,X) = C(S)L:iEsxi for aH SEN and all x E R.~, and if c(S U {i}) = c(S) for all 
(2) 1: S ç N\ {i} , then Yi = c ( {i} ) Xi. Rules that only look at the final cost function C, such 
as the Shapley ~alue on C, do not satisfy this property. 
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Appendix 
A.l Proof of Theorem 1 
Proof. Step 1: Define a linear operator for each agent 
Let el, ... , en denote the standard basis vectors for IPlN . Applying Demand Linearity, it 
follows that: 
n 
Yi(C, x) = L XkYi(C, ek). 
k=l 
Fix k and define an operator 'l7k : r -4 IPlN where 
Applying Technological Linearity, we have that 'l7~ is a linear function in r. 
Following the Theorem 1 of Weber (1988), there is a collection of constants 
{af(S) : 0 =1 S ç N} such that 
'l77(c) L af(S)c(S). 
0#SÇN 
Step 2: Show that 'l7k is a marginal contributions rule 
For ail 0 =1 S ç N, define a cost vector ds such that we have an average cost of 0 if 
Sis part of the coalition that pro duces the good, and 1 otherwise. Formally, ds(T) = 0 if 
S ç T and 1 otherwise. Note that for ail 0 =1 S ç N, ds E rand that agents in N\S are 
technological dummies in ds. Define d such that d(S) 1 for ail SEN. Note that ail agents 
in N are technological dummies in d. 
We have that 'l77(d) = L0#SÇN ahS) = e7 (by Technological Dummy (TD) Property) 
'l7f(dN \{i}) = L0#ÇN a7(S) - af(N) - a7(N\ {i}). 
Therefore af(N) + af(N\ {i}) = O. 
Suppose that we have shown that a~(T) + af(T U {i}) = 0 for every T C N\ {i} such 
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that ITI ~ m ~ 2. Take any fixed 0 =/; S ç N\ {i} with ISI m 1. Then, 
{ L af(TU{i})+a~(T)} -(a~(SU{i})+af(S» TÇN\{i} 
SeT 
L af(T) (af(S U {i}) + a~(S» (induction argument) 
0i-TÇN 
since by definition, for i E N\S, we have 'T1f(ds) = ef by Technological Dummy. Since 
2:0i-TÇN af(T) = ef, we have af(S U {i}) + af(S) 0 for all S such that ISI = m-1. 
Therefore, there is a collection of constants {pf (S) : S ç N\ {i}} such that: 
'T1f(c) L pr(S)[c(SU{i})-c(S)l+p~(0)C({i}). 
0i-SÇN\{i} 
Step 3: Find values for the weights pi 
Fix i E N. 
For each S ç N and k :::; ISI , we define a cost vector c~ such that coalitions that are part 
of S and, have no more than k members have an average cost of 1, with aU other coalitions 
having an average cost of O. Formally, let c~ be such that c~(T) = 1 if T ç Sand ITI :::; k, 
and 0 otherwise. Note that agents in Sare technological dummies in cf SI' 
For alll E N, we have that y!(c!;/"é) 'T11{c!;/,). By TD, we must have Yi(c!;/"e i ) = 1 and 
Yj(c!;/"é) 0 for jE N\ {i}. However, for l = i,j, we have 'T1f(c:~r) = pt(0). Therefore, we 
obtain: 
pH0) 1, p~(0) 0, for jE N\ {i}. (A.l) 
Take a S 3 i. By TD, we have that Yî(cfsl' é) = 1, Yj(cfsl' ei ) = 0 for aIl jE S\ {i}. By 
Budget Balance and Equal Shares for Equals, Yk(cfsl' ei ) = - nllSI for all k E N\S. 
We have that Yk(cfsl,e i ) 'T1i(cfsl) = - 2:0i-Tçspi(T) = -nlISI' 
With S {i}, we obtain that pi( {i}) = n~l' With S = {i,j} and j E N\ {i, k}, we 
derive pi( {i,j}) + pi( {i}) Proceeding recursively in this manner we find that, 
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for ail jE N\ {i}, ail S ç N\ {i,j}, 
i.(S) i.(S {.}) = ISI!(n - ISI - 2)! 
PJ +PJ U Z (n-l)!· (A.2) 
The combinatorial format cornes from the fact that when we take S such that ISI = k in 
- I:0#TÇSpi(T), the relationsp;(T)+p;(TU{i}), with ITI = l ~ k, appear l!(~~l~i)! times. 
For j, k E N\ {i} and 0 =1= S ç N\ {j, k}, we have, by Equal Shares for Equals, that 
Yj(cfSI,ei ) = Yk(cfsl,ei ). However, for l = j,k, YI(cfsl,ei ) = 7]t(cfsl) = - I:0#TÇSpt(T). 
Taking S = {m}, with m E N\ {j, k}, we find p;( {m}) = pi( {m}). Suppose that we have 
shown that p;(T) = pi(T) for all T ç N\ {j, k} such that ITI < r ~ n - 2. We show that 
it implies that p;(T) = pi(T) for ail T ç N\ {j, k} such that ITI ~ r. Take S ç N\ {j, k} 
such that ISI = r. For l = j, k, YI (cf SI , ei ) = 7]t(cfsl) = - I:0#TÇS pi(T) - pt(S). By the 
ITI<r 
recursive argument, it follows directly that p;(S) = pL(S). Therefore, for all j, kE N\ {i} 
and all S ç N\ {j, k}, 
(A.3) 
For j, k E N\ {i} and 0 =1= S ç N\ {j, k}, we have, by Equal Shares for Equals, that 
( SU{j,k} i) (SU{j,k} i) H (SU{j,k} i) i ( SU{j,k}) i (S U {k}) Yj c1SI+1 ,e = Yk c1SI+1 ,e . owever, Yj c1SI+1 ,e = 7]j c1SI+1 = -Pj = 
i (S U {.}) - i ( SU{j,k}) - (SU{j,k} i) Th cc· k N\ {.} d II S C 
-Pk ] - 7]k c1SI+1 - Yk c1SI+1 ,e. erelore, lOr], E z an a _ 
N\ {j, k} , we have 
p;(SU{k}) =pi(su{j}). (A.4) 
By Equal Shares for Equals, we have that yj(c~\{i}, ei ) = Yk(C~\{i}, ei ) for ail j, k E 
N\ {i} and m < n-l. However, for l = j, k, YI(C~\{i}, ei ) = 7]t(~\{i}) = - I:SÇN\{i,j} p;(S). 
ISI=m 
Combining this result with (A.3) and (A.4), we obtain, for ail j, k E N\ {i} , all S ç N\ {i, j} , 
all T ç N\ {i, k} such that ISI = ITI , that 
(A.5) 
Define 8fsi = p;(S) for S ç N\ {i,j} and jE N\ {i}. 
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We obtain, using (A.1), (A.2) and (A.5), for jE N\ {il 
p;(0) 0 
PJ(S) = Oisl for aU S ç N\ {i,j} (A.6) 
p;(S U {i}) = ISI!(7n-I~~!- 2)! - 0isl for aU S ç N\ {i,j}. 
It remains to define values for pHS), S ç N\ {il . 
For each 0 i S c N\ {il and jE S, we have, by TD, that Yj(crSI,é) O. We also have 
that, for aU k E N\S, Yk(cfsi'é) = 7J~(crsl) = - I:0fTÇSpi(T). 
By (A.6), Yk(CrSl'e i ) OL!(I~'~l)! for aU k E N\(Su {il) (since p~(T) depends 
only on the cardinality of T). By budget balance, it follows that I:jEN Yj(cfsl' ei ) = O. 
Therefore, Yi (crsl ,ei ) pHS) = (n - ISI - 1) I:l!11 0; . With S = {j}, 
we have thatpH {i}) -en 2)Oi· For S = {j, k}, we obtain pH {i}) +P:( {k}) + pH {j, k}) 
-(n-3)(20~ +0;). Since P:( {j}) pH {k}) = -(n-2WL we obtain pH {i, k}) = 20~ -(n-3)0;. 
Proceeding recursively in this manner, we obtain that 
for any 0 i S c N\ {i} , with the convention that 06 = o. 
Therefore, 
p~(0) 1 
p~(S) ISI 0(sl-1 - (n -ISI 1) Oisl for 0 i S ç N\ {il 
p~(N\{i}) (n - 1W~-2. 
Step 4: Show that O~ 
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For l,m E {i,j} and l =1- m, we have, by Step 3, that 
pl(0) +pr(0) p!({m}) - pr({m}) 
1 
n 1 
Directly, we have that O~ Ol 01 • 
N ow take k such that 1 < k :::; n - 2 and suppose that we hàve shown that oL 1 oL 1 • 
We show that this implies 01 = o{. 
Take S such that ISI = k+ 1 and i,j E S. By Equal Shares for Equals, we have Yi(C~, ei + 
For l,m E {i,j} and 1 =1- m, from Step 3 
pl(0) + pr(0) - p!(S\ {l}) - pr(S\ {l}) 
= 1 +0 01 ( k- )01 _ (k-l)!(n-k-l)! Om k k-1+ n 1 k (n-l)! + k-1' 
By induction, the result is that Ok = ot, = Ok. 
Therefore, y must be as claimed. 
We leave it to the reader to verify that aIl such rules satisfy the four properties. • 
A.2 Properties of y* and y' 
Lemma 1 y* is a budget balanced T'Ule that satisfies the Technological Dummy property, 
Technological Linearity, Demand Linearity, Equal Shares for Equals, the Stand-alone prop-
erty and Technological Monotonicity. 
Proof. Fix i,j EN. 
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Budget balance: 
L c({k})Xk + L L xIShk(VI(·,C)) 
kEN kEN IEN\{k} 
Lc({l})XI + L L xIShk(VI(.,C)) 
IEN IEN kEN\{l} 
L c ({l}) Xl + L xI(c(N) - C( {l})) 
lEN lEN 
c(N) LXI = c(N)x(N) 
IEN 
Technological Dummy: Suppose that c is such that c(S U {i}) = c(S) for aIl 0 -1= S ç 
N\ {i} . For any k E N\ {i} and any S E N\ {i, k}, vk(S U {i}, c) = c(S U {i, k} ) - c( {k}) = 
c(SU{k}) -c( {k}) = vk(S, c). We also have that vk({i} , c) = c({i, k}) -c( {k}) = O. Thus, aIl 
marginal contributions of agent i are equal to zero and Shi(Vk(-, c)) = 0 for aIl k E N\ {i}. 
Therefore, yi (c, x) = c( { i} )Xi. 
Technological Linearity: For Cl, c2 E rand (31' (32 E IR such that (31 Cl + (32c2 E r, we 
have that, for any j E N, and any 0 -1= S ç N\ {j} 
Therefore, 
(31 Cl ({i}) + (32 C2 ({i}) + L xjShi(vj (·, (31 c1 + (32 C2 )) 
iEN\{i} 
(31 C1 ({i})+(32 C2 ({i})+ L Xj [(31Shi(vj(.,Cl))+(32Shi(vj(.,C2))] 
jEN\{i} 
(31 yi (cl, x) + (32Yi(c2, x). 
Demand Linearity: FoIlows directly from the fact that demands enter y* in a linear 
fashion. 
Equal Shares for Equals: Suppose that we have c such that c( S U {i}) == c( S U {j}) for 
aIl S ç N\ {i,j} and x such that Xi = Xj. Clearly, the first terms in Yi(c, x) and Yj(c, x) are 
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equal. For any S ç N\ {i, j} and any k E N\ {i, j} 
vk (S U {i} , c) = c(S U {i, k}) - c ({ k}) = c(S U {j, k}) - c ({ k}) = vk (S U {j}, c). 
Therefore, Shi(Vk(., c)) = Shj(vk(-, c) for any k E N\ {i,j}. For any S ç N\ {i,j}, we 
have 
vj(S U {i} ,c) - vj(S,c) 
c(S U {i, j}) - c ({ i}) - c(S U {i}) + c ({ i}) 
c(SU{i,j}) -c(SU{i}) 
c(S U {i, j}) - c ({j}) - c(S U {j}) + c ({j}) 
c(S U {i, j}) - c(S U {j}). 
We thus have that vi(SU{j} , c) -vi(S, c) = vj (SU{ i} , c) -vj (S, c) for any S ç N\ {i, j} , 
which implies that Shj(vi(·,c)) = Shi(Vj(·,c)). Therefore, yi(c,x) = yj(c,x). 
Stand-alone property: FoIlows directly from the fact that Shi (v j , c) :S 0 for aIl i, j E N 
and aIl c Er, and from the fact that x E lR~. 
Technological Monotonicity: Fix x E lR~ and SEN such that i E S. Take c, c'E r such 
that c(S) ;::: c/(S) and c(T) = c/(T) for aIl TE N\S. For any k E N\ {i}, vk(S\ {k}, c) = 
c(S) -c( {k}) ;::: c/(S) -c( {k}) = vk(S\ {k}, c'), while vk(T, c) = vk(T, c') for aIl T -=1- S\ {k}. 
By the properties of the Shapley value, Shi(Vk(.,c)) ;::: Shi(Vk(·,c/)). Then, yi(c,x) ;::: 
yi (c', x) .• 
Lemma 2 y' is a budget balanced rule that satisfies the Technological Dummy property, 
Technological Linearity, Demand Linearity, Equal Shares for Equals and No Reshuffiing. 
Proof. Fix c E r, x E lR+', i E N. 
Budget-balance: EiEN y~(c, x) = ëx(N) + EiEN Shi(c)x(N) - ëx(N) = c(N)x(N). 
Technological dummy property: If i is a technological dummy in c, c( Su {i} ) - c( S) = 0 
for aIl 0 -=1- S ç N\ {i} . Immediately, we have that c = c( {i}). AU marginal contributions 
are equal to zero, except c( {i} ). Therefore, Shi (c) = ~ and yH c, x) = c( {i} )Xi. 
Technological Linearity: Let c = f3l Cl + f32c2 such that c, Cl, c2 E r, f3l, f3 2 E lR+. Clearly, 
c = f3l Cl + f3 2c2 . It follows, by the properties of the Shapley value, that y~ (c, x) = f3 l y~ (cl, x) + 
f32Y~(C2, x). 
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Demand Linearity: FoIlows directly since Xi and x(N) enter y' linearly. 
Equal Shares for Equals: If c(S U {i}) = c(S U {j}) for aIl S ç N\ {i, j} , then Shi(c) = 
Shj(c). Therefore, if Xi = Xj, then y~(c,x) = yj(c,x). 
No Reshuffiing: Fix SEN. 
2:iES y~(c, x) = ëx(S)+x(N) 2:iES Shi(c) - ~ëx(N). It depends only on x(S) and x(N) . 
• 
A.3 Independence of properties 
We show that if n 2': 3, Theorems 2, 3 and 4 are tight. We find a budget-balanced rule 
satisfying aIl but one of the properties used. 
Define C(S,c,x) = c(S)x(S), the function that assigns the total cost to each coalition. 
Define yl(c,X) = Sh(C(·,c,x)) as the Shapley value on the stand-alone game C. One can 
verify that yI satisfies Budget-balance and aIl properties in Theorems 2 and 3 but the Tech-
nological Dummy property (see example 2). 
For aIl i E N, define 
2 . 2:0fSC N\{i}C(SU{i})-c(S) [ 1 
Yi (c,x) = c({t})Xi + 2: 2: (SU {'}) _ (S) c(N)x(N) - L c({j})Xj , jEN 0fSc::::N\{j} c J c jEN 
if 2:jE N 2:0fSc::::N\{j} c(SU{j}) -c(S) -=1= 0 and y;(c,x) = c( {i} )Xi otherwise. One can verify 
that y2 satisfies Budget-balance and aIl properties in Theorems 2 and 3, but Technological 
Linearity. 
For aIl i,j E N and aIl x E lR~, let S{(x) = {k E N\ {j} 1 Xk < xd and S{(x) 
{k E N\ {j} 1 Xk = xd· AIso, for aIl 0 -=1= T ç S{(x), define w{(T,c,x) = c(T U S{(x)) -
c(S{(x)). For aIl kEN, define O{(c,x) = Shk(w{(·,c,x)) where Shk(w{(.,c,x)) is the Shap-
leyvalue of the TU-game w~(-,c,x), defined for the set of agents S~(x). 
For aIl c E r and aIl x E lR~, define 
yf(c,x) = c({i})Xi + LO{(c,x)Xj' 
Ni 
One can verify that y3 satisfies Budget-balance and aIl properties in Theorems 2 and 3 
but Demand Linearity. 
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Let 11" be aI!- ordering of agents in N, and define Sf c N as the set of agents coming 
before i in the ordering 11". Then, define y4 as foUows: 
yt=C({i})Xi+ L Xj (c(S; U{i,j}) c(Sfu{j})). 
jEN\{i} 
One can verify that y4 satisfies Budget-balance and aU properties in Theorems 2 and 3 
but Equal Shares for Equals. 
The foUowing table, where "+" signifies that the property is satisfied, and "_" that it is 
not, summarizes the results: 
y. y' 
Technological Dummy property + + 
Technological Linearity + + 
Demand Linearity + + 
Equal Shares for Equals + + 
Stand-alone property + 
Technological Monotonicity + 
For aU c E r all x E 1R~ and aU i EN, define 
yf(c,x) = c(N)x(N). 
n 
yl 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + 
4- + + 
One can verify that y5 satisfies Budget-balance and aU properties in Theorem 4 but the 
Technological Dummy property. 
For aU c E r aU x E 1R~ and aU i EN, define 
6( )_-( X(N)) ({.})x(N) x(N) (c(N) c(N\{i!)) [C(N) 
Yi c, x - C Xi - -n- + c t -n- + L.,jEN(c(N) c(N\ {j})) L c(~})l 
jEN 
if L.,jEN (c(N) c(N\ {j}) of: 0 and y?(c,x) = y'(c,x) else. 
One can verify that y6 satisfies Budget-balance and all properties in Theorem 4 but 
Technological Linearity. 
For aU i,j E N and x E 1R~, let Si(X) = {j ENI Xj < Xi} and 5\(x) {k ENI Xj Xi}. 
AIso, for aU0 of: T ç Si(X), define wi(T,c,x) = C(TUSi(X)) C(Si(X)). Define (}i(C,X) = 
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Shi(Wi(·, c, x)) where Shi(Wi(·, c, x)) is the Shapley value on the TU-game Wi(·, c, x), defined 
for the set of agents Si (x). 
For aH c E r and aH x E IR~, define 
yJ(c,x) = ë({i})Xi+Oi(C',X)x(N). 
One can verify that y7 satisfies Budget-balance and aH properties in Theorem 4 but 
Demand Linearity. 
For aH c Er, take an ordering of the agents such that c({l}) ~ c({2}) ~ ... ~ c({n}). 
For aH i E N, let Si = {j ENI j < i} . Then, for aH x E IR~, define 
y~(c, x) = ë (Xi - x~)) + c ({ i}) x(;) + x(N) (c' (Si U {i}) - c' (S;)) . 
One can verify that yB satisfies Budget-balance and aH properties in Theorem 4 but Equal 
Shares for Equals. 
The following table summarizes the results: 
y* y' y5 y6 y7 yB 
Technological Dummy property + + + + + 
Technological Linearity + + + + + 
Demand Linearity + + + + + 
Equal Shares for Equals + + + + + 
No ReshufRing + + + + + 
Chapter 3 
Automatic user contributions and 
price competition 
, 
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1 Introduction 
Studies of vertical differentiation models with endogenous quality have focused on cases 
where quality can be improved throughR&D (see for instance Lehmann-Grube (1997)). 
We consider a different form of innovation, made through· user contributions. The recent 
phenomenon of the open-source movement, where a large group of users devote time and 
energy toimprove software, with its code being freely available, has attracted the most 
attention. However, users can provide various types of contributions to a product: the 
presence of an extra user can affect instantaneously the welfare of other users (network 
externality) , a user can freely choose to work on the improvementof the quality of the 
. product (voluntary contribution), or a user improves the future quality of the product just 
by consuming it (automatic contribution). 
The first type includes classical examples such as cell phones and competition between 
technological standards (for instance Blu-Ray vs HD-DVD), but also community-based web-
sites like Facebook. Examples of the second type include the previously mentioned case of 
open-source softwares, but also websites presenting user-generated content like YouThbe and 
Wikipedia. The third type of contribution includes many recent examples such as a software 
company automatically tracking bugs and crashes, searchengines tracking the links clicked 
by their users to improve the quality of the search results andanti-virus software companies 
tracking malicious activities on their users' systems to improve the protection offered. A more 
traditional way to interpret automatic user contributions would be cases where each sales 
made help the fum improve the product, for instance through an improvement in after-sales 
services. 
The paper focuses on the third kind of user contribution, which has received little at-
tention but is gaining in prevalence. This type of contribution differs from voluntary con-. 
tributions by the fact that users do not decide whether to contribute ornot. While in the 
open-sourcing literature much attention has been devoted to the determinants of contribu-
tions (Lerner and Tirole (2005), Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter (2006), Shah (2006), Bagozzi 
and Dholakia (2006)) or on the way the contributors are organized (Grewal, Lilien, and 
Mallapragada (2006), Baldwin and Clark (2006)), this is a non-factor with automatic user 
contributions. We can focus on how agents choose among different products, with contribu-
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tiûns being a functiûn ûf sales. Nûtealsû that ûpen7sûurcing firms are uSually mo.delled as 
nûn-prûfit maximizing (althûugh the ûpen-sûurcing and free sûftware mûvements are nût the 
same), while the examples we have ûf autûmatic cûntributiûns pûint tû prûfit-maximizing 
behaviûr. 
Autûmatic cûntributiûns differ frûm netwûrk externalities by the timing ûf the bene fit 
tû ûther users. Netwûrk externalities are usually such that agents create instant benefits 
fûr ûther users and agents have large switcbing Cûsts tû mûve frûm ûne prûduct tû anûther. 
The behaviûr ûf a cûnsumer therefûre depends ûn bis expectàtiûns ûf future sales while, with 
autûmatic cûntributiûns, a cûnsumer ûnly cares abûut current qualities and prices. 
" Nûte that autûmatic cûntributiûns are reiated tû but different frûm learning-by-dûing, 
which usually has an impact ûn Cûst and nût ûn quality. Learning-by-dûing usually has a 
positive spillûver ûn the whûle industry, whereas here fums cûmpete fûr cûntributiûns. 
We mûdel autûmatic cûntributiûns in the fûllûwing way. Firms play a 2-periûd game 
and start with given qualities ûf their prûduct. In the first periûd, the develûpment phase, 
they" chûûse a price, and make sûme sales. The sales made in the develûpment phase affect 
the quality ûf the gûûd in the secûnd periûd, the maturity phase. There are no. switching 
cûsts, and the gûûd is nût durable, sû agents can switch prûducts withûut being penalized. 
We mûdel firms as prûfit-maximizing. Mûreûver, prices will be lûûselydefined here, and can 
include indirect costs incurred by the users such as ad banners, use ûf E-mail fûr cûmmercial 
purposes, etc. This alsû allûws us tû have negative priees (users can win prizes, etc.). A 
reeent example ûf these negative priees is Microsûft's reward pûint system fûr its search 
engine Live Search. 1 
The prûpûsed mûdel is part ûf the literature ûn vertical differentiatiûn with endûgenûus 
quality initiated by Shaked and Suttûn (1982). Our main distinctiûn is the fact that the 
quality impwvement technûlûgy here is rival, as firms fight fûr custûmers and their cûntri-
butiûns. Cûmmûn cûnclusiûns ûf vertical differentiatiûn mûdels include different qualities 
ûbserved in equilibrium and a high-quality advantage. In particular, Tirûle (1988) ûbtains 
maximal differentiatiûn in a mûdel with cûvered markets and costless quality investment. 
With autûmatic user cûntributiûns, we shûw that maximal differentiatiûn is à possible ûut-
l "Microsoft sweetens pay-to-search deal", Yi-Wyn Yen, CNNrnoney.com, Septernber 29, 2008, 
" http://techland.blogs.fortune.cnn .com /2 008/09/2 9/ rnicrosoft-sweetens-its-pay -to-search-d ea 1-2/, v iewed on 
October "1, 2008. 
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come but, depending on the parameters, is not always an equilibrium. 
More generally, the model is part of the large literature on priee competition in dynamic 
oligopolies. Maskin and Tirole (1988) provide a general framework. Among the many ap-
plications of this model, we find dynamic oligopolies with learning-by-doing (Cabral and 
Riordan (1994)) or with network and switching costs effects (Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). 
As in these models, we find evidence of pricing under marginal cost. 
We are interested in how quality evolves and if there can be lead reversaIs. Related 
contributions include Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole (1983) and Harris and Vickers 
(1987), who study possible leapfrogging in patent races, and Budd, Harris, and Vickers 
(1993), who build a model to study if asymmetry tends to grow in adynamie oligopoly 
where competition de pends on efforts (R&D, advertising, etc.) from the firms. Athey and 
Schmutzler (2001) build a general model of dynamic competition with investment, which 
encompasses many of the previous models. The general conclusions are that it requires large 
advantages, in terms of investment effectiveness, for the follower or significant uncertainty 
to obtain leapfrogging. In general, the leading firm tends to increase its dominance. These 
results will still hold with automatic contributions. 
Athey and Schmutzler (2001) also look at welfare effects, and conclude that while in-
creasing dominance of the leading firm has a negative effect on welfare, if investments have 
positive impacts on consumers (cost reductions, quality improvements), it is possible for the 
total welfare effect to be positive. In our model with user contributions, compared to a ver-
tical differentiation model without quality improvements, this total welfare effect is always 
positive. In fact, automatic user contributions improve welfare in each period. AIso, the 
(implicit) private cost for the firm to improve quality might be negative, as the incentives to 
obtain maximal differentiation might reduce price competition. We also find that in some 
parameter regions, marginally increasing user contributions is Pareto-improving. These wel-
fare effects are of interest because they determine if an industry or consumer groups, or even 
the government, might have incentives to intervene in a market to either push or restrict 
automatic contributions. 
The paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formally define the model. In Section 3, we fully 
characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this dynamic game. We look at equilib-
rium priees and discuss how they evolve with the initial quality lead and time preferences. 
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We also examine when these priees are lower than in a model without user contributions and 
when they are less than marginal cost. Welfare and individual effects are studied in Section 
4. In that section, we also examine the implicit co st of quality improvements. Extensions 
to the model are proposed in Section 5. These include dealing with asymmetries, increasing 
preferences for quality and market coverage. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The model 
Two firms a and b compete in priees over two periods. Their products are differentiated in 
quality. However, we suppose that the quality of these products evolves between the periods, 
because of the contributions of users. Therefore, period 1 is labelled the development phase 
and period 2 is the maturity phase. We suppose that these contributions are automatic, or 
proportional to sales, in the first period. We focus on the effect contributions have on priee 
competition. 
Let Pi, Xi, qi, 'Tri denote, respectively, the priee, quantity, quality and profits of firm i in 
period 1, and P~, x~, q~, 'Tr~ represent the same variables in period 2. We suppose that aIl 
quantities and qualities are in 1R.+, with priees and profits in R We suppose that the marginal 
cost of production is o. Time is discounted by {3 E [0,1]. Let IIi = 'Tri + {3'Tr~ be the total 
profi ts of firm i. 2 
Let qa and qb be given. We suppose that qa 2: qb, i.e. firm a has an initial quality lead. 
Let q~ = qi + ÀXi, for i = a, b, with À E [0,1] being the quality improvement parameter. À 
can be interpreted as the amount of automatie contributions extracted from users or as the 
efficiency it has in improving quality. Let 6.q = qa - qb and 6.q' = Iq~ - qÎJ 
Each consumer k is characterized by a marginal willingness to pay for quality rk, uni-
formly distributed over the support [0,1], with the population normalized to 1. Let u7 be 
the utility of consumer k when he buys the product of firm i: u7 = v + rkqi - Pi. A con-
sumer buys one unit or buys nothing. If he buys nothing, his utility is o. The valuation v is 
high enough that each agent buys one unit at each period. Note that each consumer has a 
negligible effect on aggregate variables and thus can be treated as myopie. 
2 Since marginal cost is equal to zero, negative priees allow for pricing under marginal cost. The assumption 
on marginal co st eliminates variables and allows for a clearer exposition. 
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3 Equilibria 
3.1 Thematurity'phase 
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium, so we proceed by backward 
induction and start by looking at the second period. Suppose that fJ.q' is known. We denote 
by L the leading firm (in terms of quality) in the maturity phase, with F being the follower. 
Note that even though we suppose that firm a has the lead initially, that is qa 2: qb, this 
order need not hold in the second period. This subgame in the maturity phase is exactly the 
classic game with vertical differentiation when qualities do not evolve. We look at two cases: 
fJ.q' > 0 and fJ.q' = O. 
Case i) fJ.q' > 0 
Let i be the willingness to pay for quality such that the consumer with i is indifferent 
between the products of firm L andF.We find 
- pi, -p'p. 
1 = fJ.q' 
From this, we obtain xi, and x'p., 
{ 
" (O,l)ifp~2:fJ.q'+p~ 
( X' x') = (l-Pl,-PP PL-PP) if fJ.q' +p' > p' > p' 
. L' F 6q" '6q' , F - L - F 
(1,0) if p~ ::; p~ 
Maximizing second period profits 7r~ = p~x~, we obtain the best responses p~bT. For firm 
L, we have3 
{ 
0 if p~ ::; -fJ.q' 
'ptT =6q'~PP if - fJ.q' :::; p'p. ::; fJ.q' 
p~ if p~ 2: fJ.q' 
3Formally, in the. first segment, firm L has no sales, so it ~oulcl' choose any price p 2: 0, Since any price 
p > 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium, we only keep p = 0 as the best response, Similiarly, in ail following 
best response functions, the sa me simplification has been made for cases w here a firm has no sales, 
while, for firm F, 
1 
0 if p~ ::; 0 
p~r = Pf. if 0 ::; p~ ::; 26.q' . 
6.q' if p~ ~ 26.q' 
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We find that there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (pL, pp) = e~q' , ~) 
such that 
'* xL 
x';. 
,* 7fL 
'* 7fF 
Case ii) 6.q' = 0 
We directly obtain that, for i = L, F 
2 
-
3 
1 
-
3 
46.q' 
9 
6.q' 
9 
1ifp~<pj 
1/2 if p~ = pj 
o if p~ > pj 
Products are identical, and we obtain the Bertrand Paradox. That is, p~* = 0, 7f~* = 0 
for i = a, b. 
3.2 The development phase 
We now consider choices in the first period. The starting value of 6.q and the choice of prices 
at period 1 determine the outcome of the whole game. There are two possible cases: when 
initial qualities are identical and when firm a has an initiallead. 
Case i) Identical qualities 
We obtain a unique E-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, which is such that one of the firm 
has the strategy p* while the other has the strategy p* + E, with Eclose to zero. 
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Theorem 1 If t:..q = 0, there is a unique f-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, such that 
pi lori = a,b. 
Proof. Suppose that Pa = Pb is an equilibrium. Then, both firms sell 1/2 units and have 
the same quality in period 2. Therefore, their second-period profits are equal to 0, and their 
global profits are ~. If firm a deviates and charges Pa f, it gets the whole market and 
achieves maximum differentiation for a global profit of Pa f + ~, which is higher than 
when f is small and Pa 2 -~. In the case where Pa Pb < 8~À, profits are negative. 
Firms have incentives to increase priees. Therefore, there is no equilibrium where Pa = Pb. 
Now suppose that Pi < Pj· We then have that IIi Pi + and IIj = 6gÀ • Firm j has 
no incentive to increase its priee as it already sells nothing in period 1. However, it could 
decrease its priee to Pi - f. That would yield a deviating profit of IIt = Pi - f + 4~À. For f 
close to zero, firm j will have no incentive to deviate if Pi :::; 
Firm i has no incentive to lower its priee, as it already selIs to aIl consumers in period 1. 
However, it could increase its priee to Pj + f. This would yield a deviating profit of IIf = ç.. 
For f close to zero, firm i will have no incentive to deviate if Pi 2 - 63À. Therefore, the only 
possibility is to have pi = - Ç- < pj. 
Putting an of this together, we obtain a unique f-Nash equilibria in pure strategies such 
that pi = -Ç- for i = a, b .• 
We therefore have the result that one firm lets its competitor have the whole market 
in the first period (although at a negative priee). Both firms then benefit from maximal 
differentiation in the second period. The leading firm enjoys higher second-period profits, 
and these more than offset losses in the first period. In fact, both firms end up with exactly 
the same (positive) profits. 
Case ii) Non-identical qualities 
Suppose that 0 < t:..q, that is, firm a has the initiallead in quality. Note that if t:..q :::; À, firm 
b can potentially take the lead in period 2. 
We first derive separate best response functions, conditional on a firm being the leader 
or the fol1ower in the second period. Of course, if t:..q > À, we only consider best responses 
where firm a is the leader and firm b the follower. 
If firm a maintains leadership in the second period, its profit function is: 
L (1 Pa Pb) + 4(3 (A + \ (1 _ 2Pa - Pb)) 
n a Pa Llq 9 uq 1\ Llq' 
with the following conditions: 
o < 1 _ Pa - Pb < 1 
- Llq-
Llq + ..\ (1 - 2Pa ;qPb ) "2:: O. 
We obtain the following best response : 
yielding 
P + ~+~ifp <-~-~ b 2 2À b - 9 >. 
EA + ~ ~ if - ~ - ~ < p < - 8/n + Llq 2 2 9 9 À - b_ 9 
Pb if Pb "2:: _8~À + Llq 
~ + ~ + !:!.q3 + EA + ~if < _~ _ ~ 
4 2>' W 2 2À Pb - 9 À 
64132 À2 +81!:!.q2+ 144!3!:!.q2 +144!3ÀPb+162!:!.qpb+8Ip~ if 
324!:!.q 
Pb+ (Llq+..\)ifpb"2:: -~+Llq 
Note that the first segment of these functions is such that Llq' O. 
If firm a surrenders leadership in the second period, its profit function is: 
n F (1- Pa - Pb) + fi (-Ll +..\ (2 Pa - Pb 
a Pa Llq 9 q Llq 
with the following conditions: 
We obtain the following best response: 
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+ Llq . 
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1 
Pb + !:::.q if Pb :5 !:::.q 
P: Ell.+ + {3>. if 2{3>. _ !:::.q < P < 2{3>. _ ~ 2 9 9 - b_ 9 >. 
Pb+ + if Pb ~ ~ >. 
yieldîng 
-!:::.q 
if YQ _ !:::.q < P < 2{3>. _ ~ 9 _b- 9 >. 
+ ~ifb if Pb ~ 2~>' ~ 
Note that the third segment of these functions is such that !:::.q' = o. 
If firm b remains a follower in the second period, its profit function is: 
with the following conditions: 
0< Pa - Pb < 1 
- !:::.q -
!:::.q + À ( 1 - 2Pa ;qPb) ~ o. 
We obtain the following best response: 
yielding 
Note that the third segment of these functions is such that !:::.q' = o. 
If firm b takes the leadership, its profit function is: 
'Ir~ = Pb (Pa - Pb) + 4f3 (-b.q + À (2 Pa - Pb 1)), 
b.q 9 . b.q 
with the following conditions: 
0< Pa - Pb < 1 
- b.q -
-b.q + À (~Pa;qPb - 1) ~ O. 
We obtain the following best response: 
{ 
Pa - ~ if P < - 8{3>. +- b.q + ~ 2>' a - 9 >. 
pLb = 1!.a _ 4{3>' if -'- 8{3>' + b.q + t::.q2 < P < _ 8/U, + 2b.q 
29 ,9 >.-,0.- 9 
Pa b.q if pa ~ -~ + 2b.q 
yielding 
{ 
_ t::.q3 + 1!.a + ~ if P < - ~ + b.q + ~ 
"4:\'1' 2 2>' a - 9 >. 
64{32>.2_144{3>.t::.q-144{3t::.q2+144{3>.p,,+81p~ if _ ~ + A + ~ < < 
324t::.q 9 L..l.q >. _ Pa -
Pa - b.q + (À - b.q) if Po. ~ _8~>' + 2b.q 
Note that the first segment of these function is such tpat b.q' = O. 
L 1 L . F L F ·t' : f t' l' b emma Pi' Pi , 'Ir(, 'lri are con ~nuous une wns Jor ~ = a, . 
Although we have different segments, it is easy to check for continuity, 
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~ +2b.q . 
From these best responses, we need to build an unconditional best response function that 
encompasses the decision to take the lead or not .. To do so, we must compare profits when 
firm i takes the leadership and when it is a follower. Let pr- be the unconditional best 
response function of firm i. We find that firms use a triggèr strategy; for low prices, they 
want to be a follower while for high prices they prefer to be in the lead. 
\ 
Lemma 2 For i = a, band i =J. j, there exists Pi such that 
Pi :::; Pi ---+ p~r (Pi) = P; (Pi) 
Pi > Pi ---+ Pt(Pi) = Pf(Pi) 
W ;th P-b E [-~ - M ~ - M] d - [~ A M ~ A M] , 9 >" 9 >. an Pa E - 9 + I....l.q + >. '9 + I....l.q + >. . 
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Proof. First, notice that the first segment of 1["~ and the third segment of 1["~ are identical. 
Th r r < 8f3>' !:l.q2 L < F d r > 2f3>. !:l.q2 F. < L erelore, lor Pb _ - ---g- - ->.-, 1[" a _ 1[" a an lor Pb _ ---g- - ->.-, 1[" a _ 1[" a . 
We thus have, for Pb 1:::; - 8~>' - !:l.t, p~r = p~ and for Pb?' 2~>' -~, p~r = p~. Notice that 
. th fir t t f F ~ - 0 h'l' th d t ~ - 1 f3>. + Pb D L ln e s segmen 0 1[" a' 8Pb - , W 1 e ln e secon segmen, 8Pb -"2 - T '2.' ror 1[" a , 
we have that, in the second segment, ~ = ~ + 4~>' + Pf and in the third segment ~ = 1. 
Profits increase monotonically with Pb in both functions, but at a faster rate in 1["~. Therefore, 
there exists a point Pb such that Pb:::; Pb ---+ p~T(Pb)= p~(Pb) and Pb?' Pb ---+ p~T(Pb) = p~(Pb). 
Moreover, this point must be in the interval PbE [-~ - ~, 2~>' -' ~] • The proof follows 
for pa .• 
Lemma 3 Pb:::; Pa and any subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (p~,Pb) must be 
suchthatp~E [P~T(Pb),Pa], andp;' E [Pb,pgr(Pa)]. 
Pro of. Pb :::; Pa follows from the fact that for any P, 1["~(p) ? 1["f:(p) and 1["~(p) :::; 1["[(p). 
Suppose that P: > Pa. Then, both firms want to be the leader, There cannot be an equilib-
rium. Suppose that Pb < Pb. Then,both firms want to be the follower. Therecannot be an 
equilibrium. • 
Corollary 1 In aU pure strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibria, firm a maintains leader-
ship. That is, q~ > q~. 
Lemma 4 Equilibrium priees are homogeneous of degree 1 in (~q,.x) . 
We can therefore express equilibrium regions as functions of () = ~. 
We say that an equilibrium is a maximal differentiation equilibrium ifit is such that 
X a = 1. This is in contrast with a submaximal differentiation equilibrium, which is such that 
X a < 1. We are now ready to describe equilibria, 
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Theorem 2 If /3 ::; ig, then the unique pure-strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium is 
a submaximal differentiation equilibrium such that p~ = - l~~>' + ~ and Pb = - 4f7>' + ~. 
Proof. We first check that (p~, pb) is an equilibria. To do so, we need to verify that firm a 
keeps the lead (l:1q' > 0), that quantities sold are in [0,1], that firm a has no incentive to let 
firm b take the lead, and that firm b has no incentive to take thelead (if I:1q < .x ). 
First, we have that x~ = 1 - P;;;" = ~ + ~~i~ and xi, = P;;;" 
x~ > x b, we have I:1q' > I:1q > O. 
1 - ~ Since, 3 27t;.q· 
Second, in order to have 0 ::; xi ::; 1, we need i~~~ ::; ~, which simplifies to /3 ::; ig· 
Third, TIa (p~, Pb) = (~ - l~~>') (~ + ~~i~) + ~ (l:1q + .x ( ~ + ~~i~) ) . We need to 
verify that firm a has lower profits if it changes its priee to be a follower. Firm a can 
achieve this by changing its priee to the first or second segment of p;. In the first segment, 
TIa (pb + I:1q, Pb) = ~ (.x - I:1q) , while in the second it is 
TI (pi, I:1q /3.x *) = (21:1q /3.x) (~_ 5/3.x) fi. (-1:1 .x (1O/3.x _ ~)) . 
a 2 + 2 + 9 ' Pb 3 + 27 3 271:1q + 9 q + 271:1q 3 
We therefore need TIa (p~, pb) ~ max [TIa (pi, + I:1q, pi,), TIa (Ej + ~ + ~,Pb)] . This holds 
under the condition that /3 ::; ig. 
Fourth, TIb (p~, Pi,) = (~- ~) (t - ~~i~) + ~ (l:1q + .x ( t + ~~~~) ) . We need to 
verify that firm b has lower profits if it changes its priee to be a leader. Firm b can 
achieve this by changing its priee to the second or third segment of pf. In the second seg-
ment TI (P* & - 4!3>') = (~ _ 19§>') (1 + ~) + i§. (-l:1q +.x (1O§>' - 1)) In the 
, b a' 2 9 3 27 3 27 t;.q 9 27 t;.q 3 . 
third segment, TIb (p~,p~ - I:1q) = ~ (-4/3 - 3) - 2f7>' < O. We therefore need TIb(p~,Pb) ~ 
max [TIb (p~, r;. - 4~>' ) , TIb (p~, p~ - I:1q)] . This holds under the condition that /3 ::; ig. 
Therefore, (p~, pi,) is an equilibrium. We need to show uniqueness. The only other possi-
ble equilibrium is a maximal differentiation equilibrium. Then, from p~, we need Pa = Pb = 
P ~ -~ + I:1q, and from pr, that Pb ~ Pa = P ::; ~. Therefore, P E [-~ + I:1q, ~] . 
Under the condition /3 ::; ig, the interval is empty. There exists no maximal differentiation 
equilibrium. • 
Theorem 3 If /3 ~ ig, then the unique pure-strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria are 
maximal differentiation equilibria such that p~ = pi, = p*. More precisely: 
i) If /3 ~ 5(;~1I)' p* E [- 5§i'q - !33>', I:1q + 5§i'q - !33>'] . 
78 
") Ir/j3 < 99 * E [ 8{3>. + A 2{3>'] n J _ 5(1-9)' P --g- uq, -g- . 
Proof. In order for (p*, p*) to be an equilibrium, we need to verify that firm a has no 
incentive to raise its priee to sellless than 1 (p* 2 -~ + ~q), that firm b has no incentive 
to lower its priee to sell more th an 0 (p* ::; 2~>'), that firm a has no ineentive to become the 
follower, and that firm b has no ineentive to become the leader (if ~q ::; À). 
To first two conditions yield p* E [-~ + ~q, ~] . This interval is non-empty if (3 2 i~. 
This is a neeessary condition to have a maximal differentiation equilibrium. 
Then, note that IIa(P*,P*) = p* + ~ (~q + À). Firm a can become the follower in two 
ways: by increasing its price to p* + ~q so that it sells 0; or by raising it to If + ~ + ~, so that 
it still sells a positive amount. From our best response function Pt:, we know that the best 
way for firm a to be a follower is by charging p* + ~q if p* :::; 2~À - ~q, and If + ~ + ~ 
ifp* E [~- ~q, 2~>' -~] • We also have that IIa(P* + ~q,p*) = ~ (-~q + À) and 
II (~+ ~ + ~ p*) = 4{32>.2+81~q2_36{3~q2_36{3>.p·+162~qp·+81(p·)2 Under the assumptions 
"2 2 9 , 324~q . 
of our model and in the relevant interval, IIa (p* ,p*) 2 IIa (If + ~ + (3g>' ,p*). We have that 
II,, (p* ,p*) 2 IIa (p* + ~q, p*) if p* 2 - 5(3i'q - ~, a condition that is more restrictive than 
p* 2 - 8~>' + ~q if (3 2 5(f~9)' 
Then, note that IIb(P* ,p*) = ~ (~q + À). Firm b can become the leader in two ways: 
by lowering its price to p* - ~q so that it sells 1, or bylowering it to If - 4~>', so that 
it still sells less than 1. From our best response function pt, we know that the best way 
for firm b to be a leader is by charging p* - ~q if p* 2 -~ + 2~q, and If - i.p if p* E 
[-~ + ~q +~, -~ + 2~q] . We also have that IIb(p*,p*-~q) = p*-~q+~ (À - ~q) 
d II ( * ~ 4{3À) - 64{32>.2-144{3À~q-144{3~q2+l44{3Àp·+81(p·)2 U d th t' an b p , 2 - -g- - 324~q . n er e assump Ions 
of our model and in the relevant interval, IIb(p*,p*) 2 IIb(p*, ~ - 4~À). We have that 
IIb (p* ,p*) 2 IIb (p* ,p* - ~q) if p* ::; ~q + 5{3i'q - (33À , a condition that is more restrictive 
than p* ::; ~ if j3 2 5d~9)' Note that when the lead cannot be reversed (~q > À), we 
always have j3 ::; 5(f~9)' 
Putting all of this together, if (3 2 5(f~9)' p* E [- 5{3i'q - {33À, ~q + 5{3i'q - {33À] , while if 
(3 < 99 * [~ + A 2{3À] N t th t b th' t l t h (3 > 99 _ 5(1-9)' P E - 9 uq, -g- . 0 e a 0 III erva s are non-emp y w en _ 10' 
To show uniqueness, note that the only other possible equilibrium is a submaximal dif-
ferentiation equilibrium as in Theorem 3. Such anequilibrium is only possible if (3 ::; i~. If 
j3 = i~, both types of equilibria are identical. • 
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Note that for aH values of the parameters, not only does firm a keep its lead, but it also 
increases it. 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the results of the previous theorems, as it describes equilibria as 
functions of the lead reversibility (0 ~) and time preferences (11). 
Figure 3.1: Equilibria type depending on the parameters 
Ij Maximal differentliltlon equlllbria (Ieapfrogglng deterrence) 
o Maximal dlfferentliltlon equlllbria (no leapfrogging deterrence) 
III Submllximlll dlfferentlatlon equlllbrili 
fi 
We see that when we have an easily reversible lead and patient firms, we have maxi-
mal differentiation equilibria, with multiple possible equilibrium priees. For the most easily 
reversible leads, those equilibrium priees are constrained because firms must deter the pos-
sibility of leapfrogging. When the lead is relatively safe and/or when firms are impatient, 
we have a submaximal differentiation equilibrium where both firms have strictly positive 
demands in the development phase. 
To see this price evolution, Figure 3.2 plots equilibrium priees as functions of the initial 
quality lead, l:l.q. 
Suppose that two firms are producing softwares, that can be improved through automatic 
bug tracking, with firm a having an initial quality lead. If that lead is small, firm a will 
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium priees as functions of the initial quality differenee when (3 = ~ and 
À=1 
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0.4 
Ol 
00 
-Ol 
-0.4 
00 
Maximal 
differentlatlon 
(Ieapfrogglng 
deterrenee) 
Ol 
Maximal 
differentlatlon 
(no leapfrogging 
deterrenee) 
0.4 
• Maximal dlfferentlatlon priee Interval 
O~ 
Submaxlmal 
differentlatlon 
oa 10 ~q 
capture the market in the development phase and achieve maximal differentiation. For a 
very small initial lead, the priee interval is also very smaIl, as the maximum priee has to 
be low so that firm b does not try to take the lead, and the minimal priee has to be high 
enough to not give ineentives to firm a to try to become the follower. Let fi and p be, 
respectively, the highest and lowest equilibrium priees. Note that when 6.q ---'> 0, fi ---'> - Ç-
and P---'> -Ç-, the equilibrium priee found in Theorem 1 for identical initial qualities. As 
the initial lead increases, the priee interval also increases. As the threat of leapfrogging 
becomes less credible, fi increases and p decreases. As 6.q continues to increase, we reach a 
point where the leapfrogging threat is no longer credible. The only constraint on priees is to 
make sure that firm a still has an ineentive to sell to aIl the customers in the development 
phase; that is, p must be high enough. As the initial lead increases, maximal differentiation 
becomes less attractive, leading to an increase in p. Note that in this interval, firm b is 
never tempted to steal a few customers, as it prefers maximal differentiation. Therefore, 
fi remains unchanged. If the initial quality lead is large enough, maximal differentiation is 
less attractive to both firms and cannot be achieved in equilibrium. Firms have different 
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priees with, of course, the leading firm having the higher priee. Both firms inerease their 
priees as the initial lead inereases, with firm a inereasing its priee at a faster rate. However, 
the differenee in quantities sold, k + ~~i~, is deereasing in Âq. As Âq tends to infinity, the 
difference in quantities sold tends to k, just as if there were no automatic user contributions. 
Observe that it implies that, everywhere, firm a sells more than it would do so without user 
contributions. 
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium priees as functions of Ume preferences when Âq ! and À = 1 
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In Figure 3.3, we see equilibrium priees as funetions of {3. For a small {3, gains in the 
maturity phase are not valued highly, and firms behave almost as if there were no automatie 
contributions. As {3 inereases, firm a becomes more aggressive in priees. We eventually 
reach a point where finn a takes the whole market, and where multiple priees ean generate 
this maximal differentiation equilibria. As {3 keeps inereasing, both firms value highly the 
gains obtained by maximal differentiation and the priee interval widens. Eventually, seeond-
period profits are so appealing that leapfrogging becomes a credible threat. To deter it, j5 
starts deereasing, while p keeps. on deereasing, but at a slower rate. The priee inter val keeps 
growing, but very slowly. The dashed lines represent what would be the priee interval if it 
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were not for this lead reversaI possibility. 
The fact that the profits of firm b are increasing in the second-period quality difference 
makes the effect of user contributions on prices unclear. While firm a has strong incentives 
to be aggressive and increase its lead, firm b might decide to concede the market in the first 
period in order to reap higher profits in the second period. Let p;;c == 
be the equilibrium priees when there are no user contributions. We have the following result. 
Theorem 4 For every possible triplet of parameters (f3, À, .6..q), with f3 > 0 and À > 0, 
equilibrium priees (P~,Pb) are sueh that 
i) All possible p~ are lower than p;;c. 
ii) There always exists a Pb lower than p{;"c. 
iii) For f3 E (3:, 3~~9 ) , there exists a Pb higher than p{;"c. 
Proof. i) For f3 :5 i~, we are in the submaximal differentiation region, where p~ = _l~~À + 
~ < p;;c. For f3 2: i~, we are in the maximal differentiation region. We need to check that 
fi:5 p;;c. 
For f3 E [ig, 5(i~ed ' fi = ~. We have fi :5 p;;c <=? f3 :5 30. In our relevant interval, and 
with f3 :5 1, this always holds. 
For f3 2: 
interval, and with f3 :5 1, this always holds. 
ii) For f3 :5 i~, we are in the submaximal differentiation region, where Pb 
In our relevant 
+~< 3 
p{;"C. For f3 2: i~, we are in the maximal differentiation region. We need to check that l? :5 
PNC b . 
For f3 E [ig, , l? = - 8~À + .6..q. We have l? :5 p{;"c <=? f3 2: , whieh is always true 
in the relevant interval, 
For f3 2: 
iii) In maximal differentiation regions, we need to find conditions under which fi > p{;"c. 
For f3 E [ig, 5(i~e)] ,fi = ~. We have fi> p{;"c <=? f3 2: 3:. Note that ig :5 3: :5 5(i~e)' 
For f3 ~ , fi = .6..q + 5{3;-q - fJ3À • We have fi > p{;"c <=? f3 < 3~~e' Note that 
> • 
Going back to our example of software producing firms, we get that autornatic bug 
tracking leads to a lower priee for firm a, whieh has the higher quality product. There 
always exists some equilibrium priees ~here firrn b also charges a lower priee. There also 
\ 
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exists a region where firm b can have a higher priee than in the situation where there are no 
user contributions. However, this region is such that firm b sells nothing. Still, without user 
contributions, firm b sells to consumers suchthat 1 E [0, tl ' who might end up buying at 
a higher price. The interval wheie this might happen is such that firm b values sufficiently 
second-periodprofits, so that it is less aggressive in order to obtain maximal differentiation; 
but not too strongly, so that it doesn't have strong ineentives to try to reverse the lead. 
Finally, note that theré are strong possibilities of obtaining first-period priees lower than 
marginal cost (i.e., negative). This is possible as firms are roody to sell at a loss in the first 
period in order to gain consumers and increase the quality difference and the profits in the 
second-period. In fact, if /3 > 3~~1J' the whole price interval is negative. At the extreme, 
which is the whole sub-maximal differentiation region and part of the maximal 
differentiation region,prices are always positive. In between, fi 2.:: 0 and E :::; O. This.pricing 
under marginal cost is consistent with sorne observed behavior. Many softwares or services 
are initially free, whiIe in the development phase, before moving to a subscriber-only pricing 
scheme, with beta versions of softwares being the prime example. 
4 Welfare effects 
We are interested in the effects user contributions have on welfare, an important issue for 
. public policies. 
4.1 Global effects 
We are first interested in the global effects on consumers and on the total welfare. We 
start by looking at cases where /3 :::; ~, where we have submaximal differentiation. We 
have three groups of consumers, depending on their valuation of quality Il' The first group 
buys from firm b in both periods. It is comprised of agents in [O,! - ;~~~] . They have 
utilityUb,bhk) = Ikqb + 4f/' - ~ + /3 (Ik (qb + -X Cl ~~1~)) ! (Llq + j + ;~;:)). 
The second group buys from firm a in period 1 and from firm b in period 2. It is comprised 
of agents in [~- ~~!~,!] . They have utility 
10/3-X)) _ L(Ll ~ 20/3-X2 )) 27Ll 3 q+3+27Ll . q q 
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The third group buys from firm a in both periods. Its members have utility Ua,a(rk) 
'Ykqa + 1~f' - ~ + (3 ( 'Yk (qa + À ( ~ + ~~~~)) - ~ (D.q + ~ + ;~~:) ) . 
Putting it all together, total utility (TU) is 
Taking the derivative with respect to À, the parame ter of efficiency of user contributions, 
we obtain 
8TU 
8À 
5(3 
1458D.q (153D.q - 116(3À) . 
It is non-negative if (3 ~ \513:. Since (3 ~ i~, this is always verified. Increasing À (while 
remaining in the zone (3 ~ ig) always increases total consumer utility. 
In this zone, firms have the following profit functions 
( ~ 10(3À) (2D.q _ 14(3À) 4(3 (D. ~ 20(3À2 ) 3 + 27 D.q 3 27 + 9 q + 3 + 27 D.q 
(~ _ 10(3À) (D.q _ 4(3À) fi (D. ~ 20(3À2 ) 3 27 D.q 3 27 + 9 q + 3 + 27 D.q 
yielding ~ = 72~~q (9D.q + 50(3À) > 0 and ~ ~ (-99D.q + 200(3À). This gives 
mIt.. > 0 if (3 > 99/1 a>. - - 200· 
Total welfare is W = TU + lIa + lIb. We obtain aar = ~ (639D.q + 220(3À) > O. 
Second, we look at the case where (3 :::: ig, where we have maximal differentiation equi-
libria. AlI agents buy from firm a in the lst period and agents in [O,~] buy from firm b in 
the second period, with the rest buying from firm a. Therefore, 
Taking the derivative with respect to À, we obtain 
8TU' 8p· (3 
----
8À 8À 9 
In this zone, firms have the following profit functions: 
413 
p* + 9" (~q + À) 
~ (~q + À) 
Yielding mL.. - ~ + 4{3 and Qlli - fi > 0 BA - BA 9 BA - 9 - . 
Note that total welfare does not depend on p*, and that we have ~~ = ~ ;::: o. 
We consider two different paths for p* : p* = fi and p* = p. 
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We start with p* = p. If i~ ::; 13 ::; 5d~9)' P = ~. Therefore, Br}! = - ~ ::; 0 
and ~ = ~ ;::: o. If 13 ;::: 5(;~9)' P = ~q + 5fii'9 - {33A. Therefore, Br}! = ?f ;::: 0 and 
mL..=fi>O BA 9 - . 
Consider again the example of the software-producing firms. Suppose that we start 
with a low level of automatie bug tracking, À, where we have a submaximal differentiation 
equilibrium (See Figure 1). By increasing À, we eventually reach a maximal differentiation 
equilibrium with 13 ::; 5(;~9)' before moving on to the case where 13 ;::: 5(;~9). Therefore, 
starting from a small level of tracking À, when we increase it, consumer utility is initially 
increasing, decreasing when we reach maximal differentiation, but increasing again when 
priees start to fall. Profits of the leading firm a are always increasing, while profits for 
firm b are initially decreasing, but become increasing before we even reach the maximal 
differentiation equilibria region. Their profits then remain increasing throughout. Total 
welfare is always increasing. Therefore, we can also conclude that, compared to a situation 
where there are no quality improvements, moving to a situation with quaJity-improving user 
contributions always improves total welfare. Also, a government interested in increasing total 
welfare could always try to increase À. 
Next, we look at the case p* = p. If i~ ::; 13 ::; 5(;~9)' P = -~ + ~q. Therefore, 
Br}! = Ii ;::: 0 and ~ = - ~ ::; o. If 13 ;::: 5(;~9)' P = - 5(3i'9 - ç.. Therefore, Br}! = ~ 2: 0 
d mL.. fi>O an BA = 9 - . 
In this case, when we increase À, consumer utility is always increasing. Profits for firm 
a are initially increasing but start to decrease when we reach the maximal differentiation 
region. Profits start increasing again when we reach the leapfrogging deterrence region. 
Profits for firm b and total welfare behave as in the previous case. 
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4.2 Individual effects 
Leaving aside aggregate effects, we now focus on individual effects of the level of contributions 
À on consumer utility. For /3 ~ i~ we once again have to choose the priee path and consider 
p* = p and p* = l? However, for /3 ~ 5(i~9)' sinee ~ = ~~, it does not matter whieh of 
these paths is chosen. The following table gives the marginal utilities and the conditions for 
them to be non-negative in the different cases. 
Table 1 : Individual marginal utilities 
depending on equilibria regions, price paths and user type 
, au Conditions for ~~ ~ ° aA 
/3 < 99 
-10 
if /3 ::; ~~ : always non-negative 
[ 1 lO/3A] /3(J+27'"Y-~-~~ 
·f /3 [39 99] 99-10@ > > 40@-39 0'"3 - 27t:l.q 81 l E 40' 20 : 279 -, - 279-60/3 
. f /3 [ 99 99] . l E 20' 10 . always non-positive 
if /3 ::; ~~ : always non-negative 
[ l lO/3A 1] /3{3J+27'"Y-~.L~~ if /3 E [99 339] . 99-10/3 < < 40/3-339 
"3 - 27t:l.q' "3 81 20' 40 . 279 -, - 279 60/3 
if /3 E [339 99] . 40' 10 . always non-positive 
[~, 1] 2/3(12+27'"Y+~-~ ) if /3 ::; ~g : always non-negative 81 
·f /3 [79 99] 40@-129 l E 10' 10 : , ~ 279+30/3 
99</3<~ *--10 - - 5(1-9)' P - P 
[0, ~] _2.t3. Always non-positive 9 
[~, 1] /3(,-~) ,>§. 
- 9 
99 < /3 < ~ *-10 - - 5(1-9)' p -l? 
[0, ~] 2.t3. Always non-negative 9 
[~, 1] /3(,+~) Always non-negative 
/3 > 99 
- 5(1-9) 
[0, ~] 
° 
Always non-negative 
[~, 1] /3(,-~) Always non-negative 
Combining these results, we can formulate the following theorem. 
Theorem 5 For p* = p or p* = p, increasing À is a Pareto-improving measure if and only 
if /3 ~ 5(i~9)· 
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While increasing the contribution level À adds only marginaIly to the quality q~, it has 
a larger (negative) effect on first-period priee because of the threat of lead reversaI. This 
priee decrease in the first period, plus increased quality for those buying from firm a, are 
sufficient to compensate for second-period priee increases. For firms, priee increases in the 
second period more than offset this first-period price decrease. 
Note also that for (3 :S ~~, aIl consumers would agree to increase À. For a larger (3, the set 
of consumers willing to lobby for more user contributions is composed of agents that highly 
value quality. There are always sorne consumers that would prefer À to increase. 
4.3 Costs of improving quality 
We now examine the cost at which we obtain the quality improvement in the maturity 
phase. In particular, we compare the automatic user contributions case to the one where 
improvements come from R&D. In an equivalent two-period model, a firm would invest in the 
first period, reaping the benefits in the second period. Sinee there are no strategic components 
to priees, the leading firm charges ~ in the first period and 2~q' in the second period, while 
the trailing firm charges ~ and ~. Therefore, the leading firm a, if it increases its quality 
by Za, will have profits of ~ - C (za) + (3 4~q' , where C (.) is the investment needed. Similarly, 
the trailing firm would have profits of ~ - C(Zb) + (3~ for an improvement in quality of 
With user contributions, this cost is indirect. To improve quality, firms modify strate-
gicaIly their priees, thus changing their first-period profits. We can, therefore, define the 
(implicit) private cost of improving quality as the forgone profits in period 1, compared to 
the situation with no user contributions. In the maximal differentiation case, only firm a 
improves its quality (by À). We obtain: 
Interestingly, this cost is not always positive. In the leapfrogging deterrence region, if 
(3 < 3~~O' there exist equilibrium priees such that this cost is negative. In the no leapfrogging 
deterrence region, we have the same result if (3 > 2(). This result is closely related to Theorem 
4, as it is the combined effort of both firms to restrict competition in order to obtain maximal 
88 
differentiation that allows it. It is interesting that, potentially, firm a can increase its profits 
in both periods while increasing its quality by .-\. 
We do, however, have to consider the fact that firm b also contributes to the quality 
improvement, as it also sees its profits affected. In the maximal differentiation region, it 
loses its first period profits of ~. Let Cp(za, Zb) be the total private cost of improving 
quality. We obtain 
Cp(.-\,O) = 56.q _p*. 
9 
There is still the possibility of negative total private cost, this time if 5t < (3 < 3~~/1' 
The consumers are also affected by the strategie choice of priees, as under automatic user 
contributions, sorne of them that would have bought from firm b end up buying from firm 
a, which has higher quality. Let u NUC be the first-period utility of consumers when there 
are no user contributions, and let uUc (za, Zb) when there are. In the màximal differentiation 
region, we have 
Let B(za, Zb) = u Uc (za, Zb) - u NUC be the benefits obtained by consumers when there 
are user contributions. We have 
B(.-\,O) = l~~q - p* > O. 
We can now define the social cost of quality improvements, C8(Za, Zb), as Cp(za, Zb) -
6.q 
C8(.-\,0) = -18::; o. 
Therefore, socially, the immediate cost of improving quality is always negative when we 
are in the maximal differentiation region. We now look at the submaximal differentiation 
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. . h· h - 2À 1Oj3À2 d - À 1Oj3À2 nT bt· reglOn, m W IC Za - "3 + 27Aq an Zb - 3" - 27Aq. vve 0 am 
C (2À 1O,8À2) 
a 3 + 27t1q 
8,8 À 140,82À2 
-+ >0 81 729t1q-
C (~_ 1O,8À2) 
b 3 27t1q 
14,8À 140,82 À2 
-----sI - 729t1q 2: O. 
Th f C ( 2À 1Oj3À2 À 1Oj3À
2 ) - 22j3À p. . . h ere ore, F "3 + 27Aq' 3" - 27Aq -~. nvate costs are posItive as t e extra 
competition brought by the user contributions decreases priees. 
Consumers still gain, even though not aIl consumers buy from firm a. We have 
U UC (2À 10,8À2 ~ _ 1O,8À2) 
3 + 27t1q' 3 27t1q 1!-~ ( (t1q 4,8À)) ,qb- --- d, o 3 27 
. li ( (2t1q 14,8À)) + ,qa - -- - -- d, 
.!._ 'OIL\ 3 27 
3 ~
llqb qa 32,8À 50,82 À 2 
18" - 9" + ---sI + 729t1q· 
Th C B (2À 1O@À
2 À 1Oj3À2 ) _ 32@À 50@2À 2 0 A . . fr 
erelore, "3 + 27Aq' 3" - 27Aq - 81 + 729Aq 2: . gam, consumers gam om 
the increases in qualities. Putting it aIl together, we obtain 
C (2À 10,8À2 ~ _ 1O,8À2) __ ,8À _ 50,82 À2 < 
S 3 + 27t1q' 3 27t1q - 9 729t1q - O. 
Onee again, socially, the first-period cost of improving quality is negative. We can verify 
that second-period welfare is increasing in À. Therefore, we can conclude that not only do 
automatic user contributions increase total welfare, they also increase it in every period. 
We can also conclude that the social cost of quality improvements with automatic user 
contributions is always negative. Private costs are positive in the submaximal differentiation 
region, but might be negative when there is maximal differentiation. Figure 3.4 shows where 
we might have negative private costs. 
Note that even though automatic user contributions are efficient the extent of quality 
improvement that can be done using them is limited. There is a strong possibility that 
quality improvements would be larger with R&D. Therefore, it would be wise to push for 
as much automatic user contributions as possible and then complement these improvements 
with R&D to improve welfare even further. 
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Figure 3.4: Regions where private costs of improving quality might be negative 
{J 
8 
• CG and CF possibly negative 
• CG possi bly negative , CF always non-negative 
5 Extensions 
5.1 Asymmetry and Iead reversaIs 
While previous results showed that there are no equilibria where the leader changes between 
periods, this was in part due to the fact that firms are symmetric in every aspect except 
initial quality. Obviously, by making firms asymmetric, we couid find situations where there 
can be Iead reversaIs. Suppose that 0 :5 Aa < Ab :5 1. Since firm b is more efficient than firm 
a in using contributions from its user s, we might have some equilibria where b takes the Iead. 
While the conditions for this type of equilibria to happen are complicated in the general 
case, we can focus on a particular example. Suppose that l:l.q 1 and Ab = 1. If 
Àa :5 t, there is an equilibrium where b takes the lead but firm a still has a positive demand 
in period 1. If Aa :5 0.3289, there are equilibria where firm b takes the lead and sens to an 
consumers in period 1. For any larger Àa, firm a always keeps the lead. Therefore, we need 
considerable asymmetries to obtain lead reversaIs. 
Similar Iead reversaIs can ,be obtained if we add asymmetry to the time preference para-
meters or to the marginal costs of prod~ction. 
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5.2 Increasing preferences for quality 
Until now we have assumed that consumer tastes stay constant over time. However, it is 
possible that as a product evolves and once the novelty effect is gone, agents come to value 
more its quality. One way to model this is to retain the assumption that rh, the parameter 
giving the preference of agent l for quality, is still in [0, Il in period 1 but, in period 2, it is 
in [J.L,1 + J.Ll , with J.L > O. Solving backward, in the second period we have that PL = Ef + 
(1 - J.L) ~ while PF = l't - J.L~, yielding an equilibrium of p* = (~ - J.L6.q', ~ - J.L6.q') . 
Sales are, respectively, ~ + J.L and ~ - J.L. Directly, we have that if J.L ;::: ~, firm F is eliminated 
from the market in the second period. When J.L < ~, we have that 7r~ = 6.q'(~ - J.L2) and 
7r~ = 6.q'(~ - J.L)2. 
We obtain a submaximal differentiation equilibrium if (3 S; 99i~2Jf, where p~ = ~ -
14@>. _ ~+2(3).1I2 andp* = A'l_ ~ - ~+2(3).1I2 Sales are respectively ~+ 4/3>' -~ 27 9 t-"'. b 3 27 9 t-"' • 3 27 tl.q 9tl.q 
and ~ - 2~~~ + ~@tl.>-t. We therefore get less sales for firm a (and thus less differentiation) 
than in the corresponding case where preferences are not increasing. The price for firm b is 
always lower, while firm a's price is lower if J.L < ~. 
As in our model, for (3 ;::: 99i~2Jf, we have maximal differentiation equilibria with p~ = 
Pb = p*. The interval for p* will vary depending on the parameter region. If (3 S; (l-9)~~-61-')' 
this interval is [6.q - 2(3). (~- J.L2) ,2(3). G - J.L)2]. If (3;::: (1-9)~L61-')' this interval is 
[ 
5(36.q (3). ( 6.q >') 5(36.q (3). ( 6.q >')] 
-----+2(3J.L >.J.L+-+- 6.q-----+2(3J.L >.J.L---- . 93 33' 93 33 
The first interval is always non-empty, but if 12J.L(1 + (}) ;::: 1Q(} and (3 > 121-'(1!~) 109' the 
second interval is empty. When the intervals are empty, no pure strategy subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium exists. This is because the follower now sees its profit being considerably 
smaller, giving more incentives to try to become the leader. Therefore, if the initial difference 
in quality is small and (3 is high, both firms will try to become the leader, resulting in a "no 
equilibrium" zone. Figure 3.5 shows these zones when J.L = ~. 
5.3 Market coverage 
We have assumed that the market is always covered, i.e. that aH agents buys from .firm a or 
firm b. Another possibility is for sorne agents to not buy at aIl. By letting v = 0, we have 
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Figure 3.5: Equilibria in model with increasing taste for quality 
• No pure strategy equlllbrium 
tjg Maximum differentlatlon equlllbria (Ieapfrogging deterrence) 
o Maximum dlfferentlatlon equilibrla (no leapfrogging deterrence) 
I11III Submaxlmal differentlatlon equlllbria 
that an agent i buying a product of quality qk at price Pk has a utility of (}iqk - Pk. If he buys 
nothing, he has a utility of o. Firm b, therefore, sells to consumers in the interval [~, pa;t] . 
This pro blem becomes much less tractable, as second-period profits are 7r~ = ti qi~ r ~~~ and 
qL qF 
l '.6.' 7r~ = C1C.?F ,q)'l. The profit functions are not only of a much more complicated form, but 
qL qF 
they also depend on q~ and q~, and not only on 6.q'. 
We can still see intuitively the effects of this change. The follower now loses clients from 
both sides: con su mers with high quality valuation buy from the leader, and consumers with 
low quality valuation do not buy at all. While in our model being the leader gave 4 times 
more profits in the maturity phase, here it gives 4~ > 4 times the profits, making the 
. ~ 
strategy to stay or become the leader more profitable. However, firm b now has more trouble 
attracting consumers in the first period, making the lead reversaI strategy much more costly. 
Since firm a has a greater incentive to stay the leader, it is to be expected that not only 
firm a will always keep the lead, but the leapfrogging deterrence maximal differentiation 
region would be strongly reduced. Note also that while, in our model, we have maximum 
differentiation equilibria, here it seems probable that in the corresponding case, firm a would 
eliminate firm b from the market in period 1, but would not necessarily sell to aU consumers 
as this becomes increasingly costly. Like in the case with increasing preferences for quality, 
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it is possible that some lino equilibrium" zone will appear. 
6 Conclusion 
.Markets with automatiC user contributions have distinct characteristics from well-studied 
models of network externalities, open-sourcing and learning-by-doing. We proposed a simple 
model that can be applied to study markets for softwares, search engines and anti-viruses, 
among others. We built a model to study price competition in a two-stage game and showed 
that maximal differentiation does not always happen in equilibrium. While there are never 
lead reversaIs, for certain values of the parameters, the threat of such lead reversais has a 
negative effect on priees. Prices can be initially under marginal cost, a behavior observed 
in the development phase of many softwares. Automatic user contributions improve total 
welfare, and increasing them might even be Pareto-improving. 
While we offered a few extensions to the model, more work needs to be done. In particular, 
firms usually do not use only one method to improve quality. The study of competition with 
firms improving quality through a mix of R&D, open sourcing and automatic contributions 
is still to be done. One interesting case is the competition between firms specializing in 
different quality-improvement methods. 
Among other interesting questions still open are the effect of automatic user contributions 
on entry deterrence or market exits (in which the welfare-improving result might become 
ambiguous), and the dynamics in an infinite-horizon mode!. 
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